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This thesis examines the Truman administration's approach to civil
liberties from 1948-1950, particularly with respect to legislative
proposals to tighten internal security, which found their embodiment
in the McCarran Act, or internal Security Act of 1950. Truman and
his aides, most specifically but not exclusively Stephen Spingarn,
Charles Murphy, and George Elsey, made their top priority political
advantage, rather than the maintenance of civil liberties.
As the Cold War intensified during the post-war period, conserva
tives in Congress sought to outlaw the Communist Party. These
attempts at repression threatened the individual's right to speak
and associate freely. Aside from the constitutional issues,
congressional attempts at anti-subversive legislation could be
turned on New Deal Democrats, including Harry S. Truman. While the
Truman administration initially adopted at least a strong rhetorical
defense of civil liberties, the position of the White House softened
as events both at home and abroad led America toward a more
repressive atmosphere. The administration's failure to adopt a
strong position in defense of civil liberties was actually consistent
with earlier actions by the President, such as the creation of the
federal loyalty program and his decision to turn over the State
Department's loyalty files to a congressional committee. Throughout
his struggle with Congress over the issues of internal security and
civil liberties, Truman remained true to his background as a machine
politician; he saw the conflict primarily in partisan terms. His
use of the rhetoric of civil liberties was more a political expedient
than a reflection of genuine concern.
The first part of this thesis examines the repressive elements of
the President's own loyalty program and his surrender of State
Department files to a Senate subcommittee. The second part explores
both the development of congressional proposals to combat subversion
and the Truman administration's response to those legislative
proposals. The third part examines the culmination of congressional
efforts in the McCarran Act. The fourth part explores Truman's veto
of the bill, the vote to override the veto, and the President's
last-ditch attempt to retain political advantage through the estab
lishment of a commission on internal security and individual rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Internal Security Act of 1950, also
known as the McCarran Act, on September 24, 1950, overriding
President

Harry

Truman's

veto

ineffective and repressive

bill.

McCarran Act

required

members

Party to register with the

of

what

Among
of

federal

the

he

termed

an

other things, the
American Communist

government

and

naturalization to any alien who had been involved

denied

with

the

advocacy of totalitarianism up to ten years prior to passage
1
of the act. The White House argued against such measures,
claiming that "personal liberty is
giving

preserved

only

by

not

to

government officers powers under which such
2
results can occur." Indeed, President Truman himself argued
in his internal security message to Congress more

than

weeks before the bill became law that "unwise

excessive

or

security measures can strike at the freedom and

dignity

the individual which are the very foundation of our
and

the defense of which is the whole
3
security measures."
Historians have

six

purpose

of

society
of

our

most often portrayed Harry Truman as a

president unafraid to speak his mind, to take a stand on the
issues, and

to

accept

responsibility

Judging from that image and the above
therefore conclude that

Truman

for

comments,

appreciated

his office owed to the Constitution of
Such a

perception,

however,
1

does

his decisions.

not

the

one

might

the duty which
United

States.

accurately reflect

2

reality.
Writers from
attempted

broad

to

of

explain

perspectives have

administration caught up in a red scare which threatened
fabric

and

of

an

the

clarify

spectrum

of

tear

to

a

American

the

society

dilemma

and

subvert

the

Constitution. Liberal defenders of the Truman administration
tend to see

the

prisoners of

a

President
hostile

and

and

his

White

conservative

House staff as
Congress, which

whipped up public hysteria in order to further its
own political fortunes.

The

President

members'

and his supporters

claim that Truman fought to preserve individual liberties as
best he could, given the
worried

imposed upon him by a

nation and an intractable Congress. Truman

saw his position on the
balance

constraints

between

security

the

measures

Communist
dual

liberties.

constitutional

validity

criticizing Congress
4
Act.

for

effective

for

book,

internal

defense

He maintained his belief in

of

Among the more recent
his

threat as one of careful

and a clear, uncompromising

constitutional

argues in

needs

himself

his

passing

loyalty
the

program

"extreme"

of
the

while
McCarran

liberal apologists, Alonzo Hamby

Beyond the New Deal; Harry S. Truman,

that Truman was determined to defend the Bill of Rights "as
5
he understood it." Truman, Hamby asserts, was not a liberal
in the progressive, Rooseveltian tradition, but
sought

"to

Republican

provide

leadership

conservatism

and

to

in

the

nonetheless

struggle

establish

a

against

compelling

3

liberal identity which could attract the blocs of voters who
6

had sustained FDR."

Alan Harper's

book,

The

Politics

Loyalty, de-emphasizes Truman's own responsibility
repression of civil

the

concentrates instead on
7
the President's noble reaction to hostile Republicans.
In

the

historians

liberties

for

of

1960's

and

criticized

and

1970's,
the

radical

Truman

or

administration

contributing to the anti-communist hysteria.
loyalty program, the

Smith

Act

revisionist
for

They cited the

prosecutions, and Truman's

strident anti-communist rhetoric.
Perhaps

the foremost revisionist critic of the

administration is Athan Theoharis. In
Repression, Theoharis
debacle which the

essentially

White

House

his

blames

faced

in

book,

Seeds

Truman

for

the

carried

on

the

Communism in all its forms
red-hunting was on a
Theoharis,

and

in

par
this

Cold
and
with

War,

in

all

that

of
the

form of the

McCarran Act. Theoharis points to the vigor with
President

Truman

which

the

strongly

opposing

places.

Truman's

of

Congress,

light, Senator Joe

claims

McCarthy

and

President Truman "differed not so much over ends as over
8
means and emphasis."
"The really insidious aspect of
Truman's rhetoric about loyalty

and the McCarthyites' cries

of betrayal," argues Theoharis,

"was

that

it encouraged a

popular mania for absolute security that extended beyond the
prosecution of overt acts of disloyalty to a suspicion of
9
all potentially subversive ideas." Theoharis corroborates
his charge by citing

the

administration's

response to the

4

McCarran bill

— the introduction of a rival anti-communist

bill instead of
legislation — as
attempt

to

concentrating
an

on

defeating McCarran's own

event that "undermined his (Truman's)

emphasize the importance of

considerations.
bill served

only

civil

Indeed, his introduction

of

libertarian

an

alternate

to

affirm an apparent need for more
10
effective legislation."
Theoharis effectively illustrates
the gulf which existed

between Truman's rhetoric concerning

civil liberties and his vigorous response to

the

Cold

War

and Communism at home.
Michael Belknap also
that

attacks

Truman.

Belknap

the administration pursued the prosecution of

Communist

Party

members under the Smith

White House needed to shore up its war

Act

claims
leading

because

the

against Communism at

home in the United States. Fearing Republican attacks on the
administration's "barren"
sought a guilty
that a

verdict

efforts,

the

Justice Department

despite its own attorneys' warning

conviction would be difficult.

that the Justice Department delayed

Belknap also asserts

public

notice

of

the

Communists' indictment on June 29 until after the Democratic
National
avoid

Convention

(scheduled for July 12-15)

so

as

to

pushing

third-party
arguing

leftist liberals
into
Henry
Wallace's
11
camp.
Belknap differs with Theoharis
by

that Truman pursued anti-communism at home

because

of political pressures rather than personal convictions.
Other critics of the Truman administration include Bert
Cochran, whose book, Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency,

5

attacks the President's handling of the McCarran bill
fashion

similar

to

Theoharis,

claiming

that

surrounding the McCarran Act revealed the way in
President, the Democratic liberals, and the
all contributed to
Truman vetoed the

the

passage

bill

in

a

events

which

the

"reactionaries"

of repressive legislation.

because of its repressive measures,

while pressing his own bill whose major distinction was that
the witch hunt would be left in the hands of the FBI and the
Attorney

General. The liberals, argues Cochran, decided

fight fire with

fire

bill which, for

repressive

proposal.

to

by introducing an emergency detention
elements,

matched the McCarran

The reactionaries, of

course, believed they were
12
saving the country from subversion from within.
In her book, Crisis on the Left, Mary McAuliffe
that liberals
"resurgence"
domestic

argues

in the post-war period, facing a conservative
due

to

the

Communist

threat

and

renewed

prosperity, abandoned the united front which

pursued during the New Deal. The ACLU

expelled

the Communist Party; major labor unions did
the ADA attacked

Henry

Party in an attempt to
support of America's

they

members

the

same,

of
and

Wallace and his liberal Progressive
compete

vital

with

center.

Republicans

for

the

McAuliffe claims that

the "new liberalism" was "realistic," cautious, elitist, and
centrist.

By

excluding

the

left

from

the

arena

of

permissible debate,

the liberals "lost sight of vital civil
13
liberties and limited the free marketplace for ideas."
This thesis

attempts to avoid the pitfalls which beset

6

the

above

historians,

who

tended

either

to be

apologists or post-Vietnam writers criticizing
the left.

administration's

internal security and

approach

civil

from

intense political

to

Nevertheless, the

the

debate

takes

due

notice

pressures of the period.

tense conflict between Congress
reflected to a significant,

between

liberties, it appears, is best

viewed from a perspective which

the

Truman

There are, of course, interpretations which fall

in between the viewpoints outlined above.
Truman

liberal

and

the

of

the

There existed a
White House which

if not all-encompassing, degree

conflict between conservative Republicans and New

Democrats.
confuse

Such

a political setting served

non-partisan

issues

with

Deal

especially

partisan

to

maneuvers,

distorting an already complicated development.
Into

this

fray

"Gentleman from

was

injected

Pendergast."

career in the 1920's as

Truman

part

of

Harry
began

the

Truman,
his

infamous

the

political
Pendergast

Machine in Missouri, owing his first office to the power and
influence

of

Mike

Pendergast.

politician were consumed with
the

Kansas

rampant

City

within

integrity.

"Am

machine,
the
I

that Truman

and

the

Pendergast

in

as

a

contracts

for

corruption which

ran

fold

taxed

Truman's

Or am I just a

to get the job done? You
14
once wrote.
William Pemberton claims

he

"narrowed

Pendergast period.

administering

an administrator or not?

crook to compromise
judge, I can't,"

Truman's early days

order

his

ethical

framework"

during the

"In fact," says Pemberton, Truman "could

7

uphold

his

ethics

unsophisticated."

only

because

The

future

they

were

narrow

president,

he

argues,

"shrugged

off

problems,

and became increasingly impatient with those

raised

the ethical dilemmas, focused

on

practical
who
15
conduct."

questions about his and his associates'

Even Richard

and

Kirkendall, who is very sympathetic to Truman,

claims that while in Missouri, Truman "accepted one

of

the

basic rules of machine politics and appointed its members to
county offices
Senate,

that

Truman

he

controlled."

obtained

patronage

After
for

entering the

the

Pendergast

Machine. Kirkendall notes that, as a senator, Truman shifted
his political

focus

somewhat

from

"old-deal"

Democratic

policy to the New Deal's emphasis on labor unions and social
workers.

"The change," says Kirkendall, "reflected Truman's

tendency

to

rather than rebel against
16
realities of politics."
As a senator and loyal
Truman

accept

the

major

party

supported Roosevelt's court-packing plan,

man

revealing

that, in the words of Kirkendall, Truman's commitments "were
17
to people, not to doctrines."
It is fair to bring

this

to the White House of the

portrait of the early Truman

late

1940's

and

early

President Truman did not change his role as an
man upon taking over the job left by
fact, a detailed exploration
experience

with

the

primarily a political

organization

Franklin Roosevelt. In

of the Truman administration's

issues

individual rights supports

1950's.

of

the

creature,

internal

contention

security

and

that Truman was

and the desire to maintain

8

political

standing,

rather

than

a

deep

regard for

Constitution, marked

his approach to the issues.

asserts

several

itself

in

ways.

First,

administration, despite its rhetoric,
for the values embodied
Amendments.

The

created by

civil

the

Truman

held no great respect

First,

Fifth,

operation of the Federal

its

and

Loyalty

Sixth
Program

concomitant emphasis on the repression

liberties,

government as
was

the

This fact

President Truman illustrated how the hysteria of

the times, with
of

in

the

the

beset

the

executive

well as the legislative.

most

glaring

example

branch of

the

The loyalty program

of

how

the

administration itself contributed to the national

Truman
hysteria.

Second, the President's decision to release State Department
loyalty files to a Senate

subcommittee

in

the

Spring

of

1950, after repeated denials based on arguments reflecting a
concern for the rights of affected individuals, revealed how
political

pressures

could

influence

a

President

whose

rhetoric appeared uncompromising.
An examination of the above two issues
for

a

more

detailed

administration's
legislation
September

equivocation
presidency,

response

repeatedly
1950.
and
one

exploration

When

to

of

repressive

the

one

becomes
which

understand more

acquainted
marked
easily

internal

security

way

Truman

internal

interplay of forces which culminated in the
extremely

the

security

proposed by Congress from

vacillation
can

the

paves

1948
with

to
the

the

Truman

the

complex

passage
bill

and

of

an
the

9

embarrassment of an already

unpopular

essence, the President continued his

administration.
partisan

preferring to see the debate as a political
than as

perspective,

contest

a constitutional or security issue.

In

rather

This approach,

it appears, contributed to the passage of the

McCarran

Act

on September 24, 1950.
A

final

concerning

note

the

remarkably
of

administrative

his

few

memos,

views

assistants,

correspondence
in

between

any

questions

Truman

and

his

Harry Truman himself left comparatively few

documentation

Library

needed to forestall

relationship

administration.
letters and

is

which

is

in

communiques,
executive

however,

stored

at

files.

left

the

assistants,

primarily

His

voluminous

Harry S.

Independence, Missouri. One finds

left it to his

or other

Truman

that

Truman

Stephen J. Spingarn,

George Elsey, Charles Murphy, Clark Clifford, Donald Dawson,
and

David

Lloyd,

communication
House.

One

authority;
executive

with
need

one
is

subordinates.

to

must,

fault the President
however, recognize

responsible

relationship with

the

President's

just about everyone outside
not

It

orchestrate

is
his

for

important

advice
to

he

for
that

the

White

delegating
the

chief

takes from

understand

his

Truman's

staff if one is to make sense of the

official papers of the Truman presidency.

10
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CHAPTER ONE

Judging Truman's administration solely by its rhetoric, one might
well conclude that his administration's concern for the civil liberties
of the American people came from a heartfelt appreciation of the
importance of individual rights in American society.

Truman's veto of

the McCarran Act could easily reaffirm such notions.

However, upon

closer examination of the Truman administration's record on civil
liberties, one finds that the preservation of the rights of the
individual was of secondary importance to the White House under Truman.
The President's concern for civil liberties did not match his, or his
administration's, desire to ensure national security and to pre-enpt
Republicans in Congress. His prosecution of the Cold VJSar, exemplified
by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, found its complement on
the

heme

front

Constitutional

in

the

form

liberties.

In

of

an

incautious

order to

understand

disregard

for

the discrepancy

between the rhetoric and the reality of the Truman administration's
position

on

the

McCarran

Act,

it

is

necessary

to

trace

the

administration's involvement with the issue of civil liberties in the
years

before

1950. Two

particularly

enlightening

examples of

the

President's lack of genuine concern for individual rights are his
establishment of the Federal Loyalty Program in 1947 and his release of
confidential

state

department

loyalty

files

to

an

investigating

ccumittee in the spring of 1950.
The President launched an ambitious and sweeping Federal Loyalty
Program with Executive Order 9835 an March 21, 1947. The program sought
11

12

to

investigate all

federal enployees and

applicants for

possible

connections to activities and associations (particularly carmunist and
communist front organizations) which aimed to subvert the policies of
the federal government.

The order required each department and agency

head to submit to the FBI the names of all its enployees. The FBI then
checked those names against

its records for evidence of disloyal

activities and associations, as determined by standards set forth in
the order.
conducted

Upon the discovery of "negative information," the FBI
a

full

field

investigation,

and

information back to the agency loyalty board.

sent

any

suspicious

If the loyalty board

found the charges warranted further action, it sent a letter and
charges to the employee or applicant, who could request a hearing.
Final authority rested with the agency head."'" Frcm March of 1947 to
December of 1952, the FBI undertook to clean the federal service of all
disloyal

individuals.

The

Bureau

conducted

6,644,496

background

checks, leading to 25,748 full field investigations which resulted in
490 persons being dismissed frcm or denied federal employment.
extra

5,921

individuals

quit

the

government

or

withdrew

An

their

applications in the face of investigation.2
The White House touted the provisions of the program which ensured
that the freedoms of the millions of federal enployees which came under
investigation would not be trespassed.
hearing,

complete

themselves charged

with

affidavits

with disloyalty.

Employees could request a full

and

witnesses, when they

found

They could appeal a negative

finding to a Loyalty Review Board in the Civil Service Cccrmissian.
Furthermore, they received a full record of the charges brought against

13

them, "as detailed as security considerations permit," as well as a
transcript of the hearings, which were kept informal and private.

The

order required that "reasonable grounds exist for the belief that the
person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States."
This standard required

proof of disloyalty, thereby (at

least in

theory) mitigating the effects of hearsay and rumor on an employee1 s or
3

applicant's status.

These procedures, as well as others, were to

"assure that the civil liberties of Government enployees shall receive
4
the fullest protection." In fact, the order itself asserted that
"equal protection frcm unfounded accusations of disloyalty must be
5
afforded the loyal enployees of the Government."
The loyalty program, however, infringed upon the rights of the
individual in many ways.

BO 9835 allowed that "the investigative

agency may refuse to disclose the names of confidential informants,"
when the security of the informants or the nation would be put at risk
by such disclosure.

This effectively denied suspects such as Dorothy

Bailey, a government employee accused of subversive associations, the
right to confront their accusers and, hence, the evidence presented
g
against them. The actual workings of the loyalty program did not
always live up to its meager safeguards.

The order claimed that "the

presence within the Government service of any (emphasis added) disloyal
or

subversive

processes."

person

constitutes

a

threat

to

our

democratic

The emphasis on absolute security led the program toward

inefficient and extreme attempts to catch subversives.

For example, on

April 28, 1951, President Truman issued Executive Order 10241, amending
BO 9835 to replace the "reasonable grounds" basis for belief that a

14

person was disloyal with a standard which accepted "reasonable doubt"
7

of a person's loyalty.

This amendment placed the burden of proof on
g
the accused and gave greater weight to hearsay and rumor. The loyalty
program

itself

stimulated

excessive

zeal

for

protection,

thereby

violating the balance between internal security and individual rights
called for in Executive Order 9835.
Other problems existed as well.

The Attorney General controlled

the listing of subversive organizations and their members (frcm which a
comparison could be made to the list of the federal payroll in order to
find enployees with dangerous connections).
had

the

power to list

The Attorney General alone

organizations, without a hearing, and

justifications for doing so remained a secret.
that much information upon which it
confidential

in

organizations

could

General's list.
secrecy

order

often

to

not

protect

appeal

his

The government argued

chose to act had to remain
national

their

security.

placement

on

the

Moreover,
Attorney

These developments had a twofold effect: government
subjected

an

organization's

members

to

wrongful

investigation by the FBI; and there developed the tendency of wary
individuals to restrict their associations.

An employee or applicant

of the federal government may have innocuously joined an organization
which claimed

to

promote

liberal

programs

but

had

actually

been

infiltrated and controlled by Ccmnunists, thus becoming a Communist
front.

As a result, uninformed loyalty boards treated an innocent

9
individual as a co-conspirator of ccmnunists. The defects of the
program inspired wary persons to restrict their circle of associations
and

placed

a

premium

on

conformity,

encouraging

orthodoxy

while

15

discouraging the free trade in ideas.^
These serious flaws in the President's program served to diminish
rather than preserve the rights of federal enployees.

The program

itself legitimized the review of political beliefs and associations,
thereby increasing pressures to extend the program during periods of
crisis.

Moreover, the loyalty program contributed to the hysteria of

the times by affirming the claims of the right that the government was
susceptible to subversion from within, thereby failing to calm the
public's anxiety.

In addition, by violating accepted standards of

procedure, and by validating the tactics of right-wingers in their
efforts to establish order and conformity, the program played into the
hands

of

demagogic

spokesmen

such

as

Senator

Joseph

McCarthy

(R-Wis.).11
An exploration of Truman's loyalty program illustrates two trends
for which the President was responsible.

First, careful examination of

the documentary record reveals the fact that, in the minds of the White
House, the need for national security, or at least the appearance of
national security, superceded the desire to preserve the rights of the
individual.
public

Second, the effects of the program actually contributed to

anxiety

and

to

hasty

Congressional

action.

The

Truman

administration once again failed to insist on the preservation of
fundamental liberties in the spring of 1950.
The President's response to McCarthy's charges that spies were
working in the State Department was another illustration of how Trunan
managed

to

sacrifice

political strength.

both

American

civil

liberties

and

his

cwn

There existed among the far right in 1950 those
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who believed that recent setbacks in foreign affairs, such as the
Ccmriunist victory in China in 1949 and the development of a Soviet
nuclear device, could not have occurred without the aid of subversives
acting within the United States Government. The discovery that Klaus
Fuchs, an important nuclear scientist, had delivered atomic secrets to
the Russians only reinforced the mounting concern of a sizeable portion
of the population unwilling to accept that the United States government
was less than omnipotent.

These fears found expression in the actions

of members of Congress such as Karl Mundt, Richard Nixon, Pat McCarran,
and

especially

Joseph

McCarthy. McCarthy, the

most vitriolic and

demagogic Republican Senator of the 81st Congress, exploded on to the
national scene with his Lincoln's Birthday address to the Republican
Women's Club of Wheeling, West Virgina, on February 9, 1950. In this
speech, he boldly announced that he had in his possession a list of 205
known Ccmnunists working in the State Department with the silent
approval of Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The number of Ccmnunists
on McCarthy's list fluctuated in succeeding speeches, dropping to as
lew as 57 and finally settling at 81. The uproar was instant and
national in scope.

In response, the Foreign Relations Carmittee set

out to investigate McCarthy's charges, and gave itself the right to
subpoena State Department loyalty files, files which came under the
12
direct control of the President.
Truman found his administration under attack frcm two directions.
One side alleged that his State Department contained a nest of spies.
Frcm the other, a Congressional ocmnittee attempted to breach the
separation

of

powers

provided

for

by

the

Constitution. Truman's
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response to this crisis revealed a political approach toward civil
liberties which undermined
credibility as well.

not only the Constitution

but

his own

Fran the start the White House clearly and

adamantly denied that Congress had the right to subpoena executive
files.

The administration pointed to earlier research which found

that, among others, Presidents Washington, Jefferson, and Tyler refused
13
to relinquish confidential information to Congress.
The real weight
of the administration's argument, however, consisted of its emphasis on
the fact that information in the files was often unproven, and to
release this information to the public would unfairly punish innocent
enployees.

J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, agreed with the

administration's stand, pointing out hew release of confidential files
"might be made under circumstances which would deny the aggrieved to
publicly state their positions."(sic) Hoover went on to argue that
reports, "if publicized, could be subject to misinterpretation, quoting
out of context, or used to thwart truth, distort half truths, and
14
misrepresent facts."
McCarthy attempted to force Truman's hand by
claiming that the only way to disprove his allegations was to open the
files.
worked.

In March of 1950, a tough election year, McCarthy's ploy almost
The

President's aides advised

Truman to make the files

available, but with restrictions. The New York Times saw this move as
a politically motivated catprcnu.se by Truman, who feared both setting a
15
dangerous precedent and leaving McCarthy's loaded charges unanswered.
The White House planned to maintain the upper hand regarding the
release of

State Department files.

The reoaimendatians of

Donald

Dawson, assistant to the President, proposed that the caimittee must
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state

its

evidence as

stipulation

would

Furthermore,

Truman

throughout

the

to

serve
would

the
to

disloyalty
"smoke

maintain

proceedings.

And

of

out"

total

an

employee.

McCarthy's

control

lastly,

in

over

order

This

evidence.
the
to

files

protect

investigative methods and personnel, the ccrrmittee would receive a
White House summary of the files, not the files themselves, for its
records.16 But as McCarthy's attacks on the State Department increased,
the President's resolve to deny access to Department files stiffened.
Truman's

refusal

senator's

concentrated

charges, and

in

attention

response

on the flimsiness of the

McCarthy reluctantly began to

release the names of "card carrying Ccmnunists" in the Department. His
charges against Dorothy Kenyan, John Service, and Haldore Hansen were
weak and essentially insupportable.

This reinforced his efforts to

obtain more information, which might or might not have been legally
admissible in a court of law but which would nevertheless be useful for
17
smearing his opponents, frcm the restricted files.
Officials in the Truman administration advised the President to
deny the subcommittee access to Department files for reasons concerning
both civil liberties and investigative effectiveness.

Attorney General

J. Howard McGrath wrote the President that to disclose the loyalty
reports, with their unproved allegations, would be "the grossest kind
of injustice to innocent individuals."

Release of hearsay and rumor

could be devastating to reputations, he claimed, because "we all knew
18
that a correction never catches up with an accusation."
J. Edgar
Hoover

reinforced

McGrath1s

arguments

when

he

spoke

before

the

Subccxrmittee on March 27. Citing security reasons as well as civil
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liberties arguments, Hoover pointed out that "names of persons who by
force of circumstance entered into the investigation might well be
innocent of

any

wrong."

"We

cannot,"

he

argued,

"disregard

the

fundamental principles of carman decency and the application of basic
19
American rights of fair play."
The next day, Truman sent a letter to
Millard Tydings, chairman of the Subcommittee, denying Tydings access
to the loyalty files.

Reiterating the arguments of McGrath and Hoover,

Truman told Tydings that it was the President's responsibility to take
care that "innocent people — both those under investigation and those
who have

provided information

—

not

20

be unnecessarily injured."

Truman championed the rights of the individual again in April when, in
a speech to the Federal Bar Association, he claimed that "our system of
justice preserves the freedom and dignity of the individual, and his
right to think and speak as he feels and to worship as he pleases.

It

protects him in the assertion of his rights even against his own
government."

The files contained unproven information, he argued, and

to release them would

subject

cleared

people to retrials in the

21
newspapers.
One would gather frcm his public statements that the President
refused to release the State Department's loyalty files because he
believed that to do so would constitute an intolerable invasion of
individual rights.

He apparently made his stand with the support of

high officials in his administration.

Yet for all his arguments, based

on precedent, investigative efficiency, and constitutional liberties,
on May 4, 1950, Truman relented and opened the 81 files which McCarthy
sought to examine.

The chairman of the investigating subcommittee,

20

Millard

Tydings,

claimed

that the

cases were identical to those

investigated three years earlier by Congressional committees.

In light

of the fact that the data had already been examined, he argued, the
President was not creating a precedent by opening the files.

Senator

Kenneth Wherry (R-Neb) countered this assertion with the claim that
Truman released the files

because

he was afraid of the public's
22

reaction on his upcoming tour of the West.

Truman's disclosure of the files may or may not technically have
been a sacrifice of the civil liberties of federal employees.

If one

accepts the President's assertion that the release was not a precedent
(and therefore not a threat to individual rights) one can only conclude
that his and his administration's previous stand relating the secrecy
of the files to civil liberties was mere rhetoric.

What is more

plausible is the argument that the President's release of the files did
not constitute a breach of the separation of powers. Hie fact that the
files contained unproven information which could be used to damage
employees'

reputations

remained.

The

disclosure

of

the

files

illustrated how pressure from the administration's political opponents
influenced the actions of the White House. By exposing civil liberties
to the whim of impermanent political developments, Truman weakened both
the

Constitution

presidency.

and,

at

the

same

time,

the

power

of

his

own

As the debate over Ccmnunist subversion intensified in

succeeding months, the President would

again

political arena, not the maintenance of
number one priority.

make victory in the

individual liberties, his

21
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CHAPTER TWO

President Truman's opposition to the Internal Security Act of 1950
did not represent a clear deviation from his previous stand on internal
security legislation, because his administration's record on civil
liberties was mixed.

Despite his demonstrated disregard for civil

liberties at times, the President on more than one occasion defended
the rights of the individual in America. Indeed, one can trace a
libertarian attitude in Truman as far back as 1941, when, as a Senator,
he opposed bills giving the federal government power to tap phones.^"
However, from 1948 until Congress passed the McCarran Act in September
of 1950, the Truman administration adopted a half-hearted position in
the face of pressure from domestic forces and from world events. Hiese
pressures led not only to a decrease in the President's political
strength, but also, due to the President's disregard for individual
rights, to a decline in the strength of civil liberties in America. An
examination of the Truman administration's handling of the initial
internal

security

legislation

proposals

revealed

the

weakness

of

executive resolve in the area of individual rights and reflected the
administration's

perception

fundamental, and

therefore

of

issues

open to

as

political

compromise.

rather

than

Congress proposed

several pieces of repressive legislation, to which civil libertarians
responded with great energy.

The White House, meanwhile, rode the

fence, one side of which contained the liberals and the Constitution.
The other side contained Congress, a nervous public, and the perceived
need to trade seme individual rights for a nation free of Cormunist
23
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subversion.
The Truman administration watched concern for internal security in
the United States mushroom during the post-war period but failed to
note its own contribution to the crisis.

In addition to the debacles

of the loyalty program and the release of the security files, the White
House continued to undercut civil liberties in its fight with Congress
over

internal

security

matters.

Alarmed

at

the

character

of

anti-subversive legislation in states such as Maryland, New York, and
New Jersey, Truman's special assistant Stephen Spingarn wrote in April
of 1949 that "since the end of World War II there has been an cminous
trend in the United States toward the increasing curtailment of freedom
2

of expression and opinion...."

According to Spingarn, the actions of

Congress during 1948 and 1949 paralleled those of the above mentioned
states.

Anti-carnrunist bills sponsored by Senators Mundt, Ferguson,

and Representative Nixon in 1949 were actually reintroductians of the
1948 Mundt-Nixon bill, H.R. 5852, which sought to control and reveal
the workings of the American Ccmnunist Party. Senators Mundt, Ferguson,
and Johnston would introduce the Mundt-Nixon-Fergusan legislation (S.
1194, S. 1196, and H.R. 3342) on July 22, 1949 as S. 2311.3 The
alarming provisions of H.R. 5852, according to Spingarn, had been the
requirements that the Ccmnunist Party and

its front organizations

register with the Justice Department lists of their officers and report
en the source and expenditure of their funds.

Truman's assistant

should not have been surprised at the extremism of the bills, since
another administration figure, Attorney General Tan Clark, had asked
Congress

in

February

of

1948

to

tighten

existing

laws

to

curb

25

subversive activities.

Clark endorsed the Mundt bill's principle of

disclosure and suggested strengthening the Voorhis Act, which required
the registration of foreign-controlled organizations with the Attorney
General,

by making an organization's officers responsible for the

group's compliance with the act.

Clark further added that, while the

proposed changes would strengthen his hand, they "might not do the
complete job."

Clark added even more fuel to the fire by asserting his

opinion that in the event of war with the Soviet Union the American
4

Ccmnunist Party would not be loyal.

The provisions Clark requested

would becxme seme of the foundations of the McCarran Act in September
of 1950, by which time Clark would be sitting on the Supreme Court.
As liberals saw it, H.R. 5852 was unconstitutional. Section 1 of
the bill described Ccmnunism and its aim to establish a totalitarian
dictatorship

in

countries

around

the

world.

Section

3

required

Carnrunist organizations to register with the Attorney General, listing
the names of all their members.

Section 4 made it a crime, punishable

by up to ten years in jail and a $10,000 fine, to act in any manner
with intent to establish a totalitarian dictatorship under Ccmnunist
control in the United States. Members of the Ccmnunist Party in the
United States would be punished if they registered and they would be
punished if they did not, thereby violating a suspect's Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination.

By proscribing acting "in any manner

with intent to establish a totalitarian dictatorship," the Mundt bill,
in effect, made it illegal to advocate the same views as Ccmnunists.
The effect of this, in the view of the liberal watchgroup, Americans
for

Democratic

Action, would

be to

limit

freedom

of

speech and
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5

association and make liberal causes suspect.

The AOLU argued that the

legislation also violated the clauses of the Sixth Amendment which
guarantee the accused the rights to a jury trial and to confront
witnesses.

The determination of which organizations were to ccme under

the scrutiny of the law would be left up to a Subversive Activities
Ccnmissicn and not the courts.

Given that power, the government would

need only show that the group had failed to register in order to obtain
a guilty verdict.

Although the organizations had the right to a trial

for violating the law, they had no such trial to determine the validity
of their listing in the first place.

Furthermore, said the ACLU, the

method of determining guilt by legislative proscription rather than by
judicial trial, as S. 1194, S.1196, and

H.R. 5852 sought . to do,

constituted an unconstitutional bill of attainder.®
Liberal activists reacted to the threat to civil liberties with
vigor.

In the 1948 presidential campaign, supporters of Henry Wallace,

former Vice President under Franklin Roosevelt, formed "The Ccranittee
to Defeat the Mundt
Washington

to

Organization,

Bill" and

protest
along

the

with

planned a 5,000-delegate march can

legislation.

the

Civil

The

Rights

National
Congress

Wallace
and

the

International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, among others,
chartered planes and trains from across the nation in an effort to
7
fight the bill and install their man in the White House. Truman, in
September of 1948, claimed that Wallace's third party candidacy was the
vehicle

by which Ccmnunists were helping the Republicans in the
Q
election.
By asserting that his administration was tougher on
Ccmnunists than the Republicans, the President revealed his disregard
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for liberal opinion and demonstrated how the conflicting pressures of
political competition could influence his position on civil liberties.
Opposition to repressive legislation did not come solely from
liberal groups, however.

Russell H. Fluent, a veteran of World War I

and chairman of the "Veterans Committee Against the Mundt-Nixcn Bill,"
claimed that "no administration in temporary power has the completely
un-American

1 right'

to declare people or organizations 'subversive'
9

just because they disagree with the administration."

Opponents of H.R.

5852 and its repressive provisions were both vocal and numerous well
before Pat McCarran would attach his name to the proposals offered by
Mundt, Nixon, Ferguson, Johnston, and others.
Events of late 1948 moved the debate over internal security
legislation to the right, and the President, ever concerned about
maintaining

his

political

viability, went

with the flow.

Truman

narrowly won the race for the Presidency in November, and on December
15 a former employee of the State Department named Alger Hiss was
indicted for spying.

The Hiss case combined with a heated political

atmosphere to encourage legislative repression.
York

Times,

in

April

1949

Senator

Pat

According to the New

McCarran (D-NV) proposed

strengthening immigration and espionage laws to protect the United
States in what he said was "the black era of fifth column infiltration
and cold war with the ruthless masters of the Kremlin.""^ In August,
the press reported that the President, unwilling in the face of public
scrutiny to combat such rhetoric, had succumbed and given the Justice
Department the exclusive power to bar from entry into the United
States, without

public hearings,

any

aliens which the department
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considered dangerous.11
Other significant developments in 1949 included the reintroduction
of the Mundt-Nixan-Fergusan legislation of 1948 with a revision of the
section which outlawed acting "in any manner" with intent to establish
a

totalitarian

dictatorship

in

the

United

States.

Responding to

criticisms of "thought control," the legislators changed the wording to
prohibit the knowing commission of an "act which would substantially
contribute" to the establishment of a dictatorship.

This concession

was minor in the face of the fact that both measures barred Connunists
12
from federally appointed jobs and from holding passports.
In July
1949, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee approved for consideration the
Mundt-Ferguson-Johnstan measure.

Ihis legislation included a revision

extending the statute of limitations front three to ten years, which
Attorney General Clark had requested.

This proposal also required the

registration of Ccmnunists.
The wording of the internal security legislation introduced in
1948 and 1949 set no limits on the type of organizations which would
came under scrutiny.

An unscrupulous demagogue might construe the

definition of Ccmnunist front to include anything
commerce, labor unions, even farm groups.

—

chambers of

In fact, it would be up to

those who held political power to define who were the enemies of the
state.

In the conservative post-war period, liberals knew, those

13
favoring New Deal-type reforms might very well come under attack.
A
good exanple of this fear was Mary T. Norton's (D-New Jersey) response
to H.R. 5852. She complained that "no person can read this bill and not
realize that it is directed against labor."

Norton noted a broader
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concern with the bill when she quoted Reman Catholic bishop Francis J.
Haas as saying that the bill was "potentially destructive of the moral
14
and civil rights of all Americans."
Henry Wallace remarked that the
real victim of the Mundt bill would not be Ccmnunism but democracy,
because, in his words, "Mundt and Nixon are more interested in devising
legislation to intimidate liberals than they are in putting Ccmnunists
in jail."1^
The administration's public response to the various repressive
proposals was one of outrage.

The President in 1948 had declared his

opposition to legislation, such as Mundt-Nixon, which would outlaw
political parties.

"I never make comments on bills that are pending

until they come before me," he said in a May 1948 press conference,
"but as to outlawing political parties in the United States, I think
that is entirely contrary to our principles."1®
The President was not alone in his opinion.

In a letter to

Alexander Wiley, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in June of
1948,

Attorney

General Tcm

Clark

pointed

out some

constitutional

problems posed by H.R. 5852. Section 2 of the bill, he stated, defined
Ccmnunism as a foreign-controlled effort to establish a totalitarian
dictatorship in the United States. He argued that section 8 of the bill
required that organizations designated as Ccmnunist which failed to
register with the Attorney General be severely punished, while those
who complied with section 8 found themselves liable for the penalties
of section 4, which imposed a ten-year prison sentence for anyone
participating

in

a

movement

to

establish

a

foreign-controlled

totalitarian dictatorship in the United States. Clark suggested that
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H.R. 5852 might be held to deny First Amendment freedoms of speech, the
press, and assembly.

The measure, Clark argued, also violated the

Fifth Amendment's right of the accused to due process by defining the
nature and purposes of an organization or group via legislative fiat.
Clark also claimed that the disclosure provisions of the Mundt bill
compelled

the

Ccmnunists to incriminate themselves, violating

yet

another clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General went on to
say that outlawing the Ccmnunist Party was not only unconstitutional,
but ineffective as well.

Ccmnunists, he claimed, would just be driven

to deny their affiliations, thereby making prosecutions of Ccmnunists
more difficult.

Also, he argued, the bill would mate "martyrs" of

Ccmnunists and their sympathizers.17 The Attorney General did not
attempt to reconcile his earlier request for tougher legislation with
the obvious constitutional problems which such a request was bound to
engender.

The executive and legislative branches, it seems, were

playing hot potato with the controversial issue of internal security
legislation.
The above positions of the administration, adopted in 1948, were
important because they illuminated a consistent thread of arguments
which the administration would make for the next two years.

The

rhetoric of the White House consistently emphasized that repressive
internal security legislation threatened not only the Constitution but
also

the

techniques.

effectiveness

of

investigative

and

law

enforcement

This dual approach allowed the administration to avoid

unpopular policies while appealing to the wide center of the American
political spectrum.

While officials would make these arguments again
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and again, the pressure to tighten internal security legislation would
remain constant also.

To understand the true position of the Truman

administration concerning such issues, however, one must take into
consideration the practices of the administration as well as its
rhetoric.
In 1948, H.R. 5852 passed the House by a vote of 319 to 58,
illustrating strong anti-ocrmiunist feelings in Congress well before the
McCarran debate.

In March of 1949, Francis Walter, a Democrat from

Pennsylvania, offered a draconian amendment to the Nationality Act of
1940 which would penalize members of a Ccmnunist political party with
18
loss of citizenship.
Another piece of drastic legislation introduced
in 1949 was the Hobbs bill (H.R. 10), sponsored

by the Justice

Department. Introduced initially by Sam Hobbs (D-AL), the bill provided
for the lifetime detention of aliens suspected of being subversive.
While the language of the bill did not explicitly denote permanent
incarceration,

it

did

give

the

government

the

pcwer

indefinitely aliens who, upcn deportation, were rejected
native countries.

to

detain

by their

In May, the ADA and the ACLU issued a statement

condemning H.R. 10, claiming that the bill inquired into the beliefs of
aliens by requiring the alien "to give information under oath as to his
circumstances, habits, associations, and activities."

No provision,

19
they argued, was made for protection against self-incrimination.
The
Nation opposed the Hobbs bill on different grounds.

Calling it a

"concentration-camp measure," the liberal magazine argued that the bill
was unnecessary

because the general criminal code already covered
20

specific "criminal or subversive" acts.
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The Truman administration also opposed the Hobbs bill, but the
manner in which it handled the bill revealed the ambivalence with which
the White House approached the issue of civil liberties.

In May 1950

Stephen Spingarn notified the new Attorney General, J. Howard McGrath,
that the Justice Department was supporting a bill that the President
had recently cxxne to oppose.
memo

to

McGrath

individual,

as

requiring
well

as

That same month, the President sent a
that

national

scrutinizing new proposals.
after

receiving

a

memo

Justice

take

security,

the

rights

into

of

account

the
when

The President made this reccnmendation

from

Spingarn

which

proposed

that

the

administration should approve only those bills that struck "the best
possible

balance"

between

national

security

and

civil

liberties

21
considerations.
The administration did not adept the argument of the
Nation which implied that there was in fact no need for compromise.
Hie concept of balance, which the administration would use again in its
fights with Congress, betrayed a willingness to compromise on the part
of the White House when it came to preserving civil liberties. Indeed,
given the President's surrender on the issue of alien detention in
1949, the balance sought was not so much one between liberty and
security as one among liberty, security, and political expediency.
Hiis consideration

had

the

effect

of

tipping the

balance toward

security.
Hie suspicion that the

Truman administration was willing to

compromise on the issue of civil liberties in order to maintain the
President's political strength was borne out by the debate surrounding
yet more proposed legislation in Congress. A major bill under review in
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1949

and

1950

was

S.

Mundt-Ferguson-Johnstcjn bill.
earlier

bills,

which

2311,

ccmnonly

kncwn

as

the

This bill possessed the main features of

required

the

Ccmnunist

Party

to

register

membership lists and donor information with the Attorney General, and
to

label

all

organization.

mailings

as

being

disseminated

by

a

Ccmnunist

S. 2311 also barred Ccmnunists frcm holding federal

offices or obtaining passports.

In addition to imposing a 10-year

prison sentence for convicted subversives, the bill revised the statute
of limitations for stealing documents frcm ten years to an unlimited
period, as requested by Attorney General Ton Clark. This revision was
in response to the Hiss case. Concerning the registration of Ccmnunist
organization membership lists, S. 2311 stipulated that the Attorney
General notify everyone on those lists.

Anyone who formally denied

membership could appeal his or her case to the government's Subversive
Activities

Control

Board

after a full

FBI

check cn

his or her

activities.
Before noting the administration's handling of legislation such as
S. 2311, one must understand the pressure that existed in Congress and
the

American

public to tighten

internal security.

Hie Ccmnunist

victory in China in 1949 and the successful Soviet test of atomic
weaponry

in

the

same

year

increased

American

anxiety

and

fear.

Suspicion of subversives at home, fueled in part by policies, such as
the loyalty program, of the Truman administration, translated into a
suspicion of liberal programs and personalities, such as the people and
programs

commonly associated

director of

Economic

with the

Research for

the

New

Deal. Onerson

U.S. Chamber

of

Schmidt,
Ccmneroe,
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expressed

this

fear

accurately

when

he

stated

before

the

House

Un-American Activities Ccrmittee that "democratic socialism may be a
mere prelude to Canttunisni." Schmidt

supported

his claim with the

argument that, in the 1930's, the Agriculture Department (headed by
Vfellace) moved toward socialism more than any other phase of the New
Deal, and more Ccnmunists and
22

there.

people "accused of such" came frcm

Many conservatives in Congress shared Schmidt's beliefs.

In

May of 1950, thirty-two proposed bills related to internal security
23
appeared in the combined dockets of the House and Senate.
The

Truman

administration,

and

civil

libertarians,

initially

responded to the security bills frcm positions which reflected concern
for individual rights.

Whereas the rights activists maintained their

vigilant opposition to internal security legislation, the White House
waffled on its ccnrnitment to civil liberties in an attempt to retain
its political strength.
In the case of S. 2311, or the Subversive Activities Control Act
as

it

was

commonly

arguments apposing

known,

its

the

enactment.

administration
In

a

presented

letter to Pat

powerful
McCarran,

chairman of the Senate Judiciary Ccmnittee, Assistant Attorney General
Peyton Ford claimed that S. 2311 might be found to be unconstitutional,
and would at the very least make martyrs of convicted Communists.
Noting the 1949 conviction of eleven Ccmnunists in New York and their
pending appeals, Ford emphasized a 1948 letter from Tcm Clark to the
previous chairman of the Senate Judiciary Ccrmittee, Alexander Wiley,
concerning identical legislation (the Mundt bill) in which Clark cited
the Supreme Court's opinion in W. Virginia v.

Barnette that stated
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simply,

"If

there

is

any

fixed

star

in

our

constitutional

constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics...or force citizens to confess by
24
word or act their faith therein."
apparently strong regard for civil

Ford's letter illustrated an
liberties on the part of the

administratian.
The ACLU and other civil libertarians joined the White House in
its attack on S. 2311. In March 1950, the ACLU released a statement
sounding the by then familiar opposition to proposals such as S. 2311.
Making sure to proclaim its "complete and unalterable" opposition to
Ccmnunism, the ACLU went on to criticize the vague language of the
bill.

The

ACLU

"substantially
dictatorship."

asked

contribute
The

Union

if

publishing

to the
also

Marxist

establishment

wondered

literature
of

a

whether an

would

totalitarian
attorney

who

defended a Ccmnunist in a political case would be guilty under this
section.

The ACLU repeated the claim that the registration provisions

of the bill constituted an unconstitutional bill of attainder by
imposing penalties through legislation rather than through judicial
trial.

The ACLU also argued that the provision providing that the

unrestricted determination of the Subversive Activities Control Board
as to which organizations were to be

prosecuted would

be final,

violated the Sixth Amendment's guarantees of trial by jury and the
25
right to confront witnesses.
Others assaulted the repressive aspects
of S. 2311 as well.

A statement dated March 31 1950 and signed by

eighteen organizatians, among them the American Jewish Congress, the
Textile Workers Union of America, and the American Council for Human
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Rights, claimed that S. 2311 threatened the organizational activity of
the entire liberal movement in the United States. Wondering where the
repression would end, the statement quoted Guy Gabrielsan, Republican
National Chairman, who said that the Socialists would be next after the
Connunists. "We haven't gotten around to them yet," he said, "but I
premise you we will.

Avowed Socialists have no more place in the

official family of the President of the United
Ccmnunists...Socialism is just the first

States than have
26

step toward Ccmnunism."

Seven months earlier, the New Republic prophetically revealed how this
would

be

done.

S. 2311, the

magazine argued,

provided

for the

Presidential Ceranission to determine a group to be subversive merely by
the group's failing to turn over its records.

Another kind of evidence

the Caimission could use would be the kinds of people who were active
27
in the organization, and the people with whcm they associated.
Despite

arguments

against

its

passage, the

Senate

Judiciary

Ccmmittee reported out the bill with a ten to one vote.

The lane

dissenter, interestingly, was a Republican, William Langer of North
Dakota. In a passionate defense of civil liberties, he claimed, "It is
proposed to regiment the thinking of the
proposed

to

confer

on

a

politically

American people...it is

appointed

board
28

therefore, unrestricted power to outlaw associations."

vague

and,

The Nation

responded to the Ccmmittee's move in a like manner, arguing that if the
bill were to beccme law, "we will have invited a future Administration
to outlaw, by the same device, whatever party or group it may find
29
inconvenient to its purposes."
Had the administration chosen to do so, it would have had plenty
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of solid arguments upon which to base a stand in favor of individual
rights.

Yet the White House retreated from its earlier hard-line

opposition to S. 2311 in favor of a more politically neutral position.
Charles Murphy and Stephen Spingarn suggested to the President that
executive policy regarding internal security legislation should attempt
to achieve "the best possible balance" between national security and
30
individual rights.
Spingarn defended this strategy years after the
crises of 1950 had subsided.

In a 1967 interview he reiterated his

position cn civil liberties, claiming that "every time you exercise
internal security you are infringing cn individual rights, and there
has to be a balance here between the national interest and the personal
interest at sane point....

Hie difficult thing is to strike a balance

31
between the two, and this will not always be the same balance."
Hie idea of balance, and the malleability of this balance, posed a
threat to the stability of civil liberties in the United States. The
strategy of

balance left the fate of individual rights up to the

political currents of the times.

Truman sought a defensible stand with

regard to civil liberties but defined his position with respect to the
hard-line anti-ccranunists in Congress rather than with respect to the
Constitution. In spite of the President's sometimes stirring rhetoric,
his actions lagged behind.

"Excessive security," Truman wrote in a May

1950 memo to McGrath, "encroaches cn the individual rights and freedoms
32
which distinguish a democracy from a totalitarian country."
Yet this
seemingly powerful statement in defense of individual freedoms had no
teeth. The President left approval of internal security legislation up
to the Attorney General's decision that a "balance has been struck"

38

between internal security and civil liberties.

The Attorney General

received no clear directive concerning the President's wishes on this
matter, aside frcm the request that the Justice Department's Civil
Rights Section become more involved in evaluations of internal security
legislation.
Hie Truman administration continued

to maintain an undefined

position toward civil liberties as sunmer approached.
received

a

memo frcm

The President

his administrative assistant, George

Elsey,

encouraging Truman to propose a ocumission on internal security and
individual rights.

Truman's assistants had brought up the idea far

such a caimission before as a way to determine in a bipartisan manner
the role of civil liberties in matters of internal security.
made the nature of the administration's strategy clear.

Elsey

"Seme such

step as this is necessary," Elsey said, referring to the ccmnissicn,
"to offset the serious consequences of the irresponsible attacks which
Republicans are making against the Government." Hie attacks, he said,
"give rise to a public hysteria...increase the likelihood of repressive
legislation...shake the confidence of people in this country in their
33
Government."
By defining the problem as a congressional, Republican
matter, Elsey and others in the White House ignored the executive
branch's own complicity in the rise of "public hysteria."

Hie negative

effect of the loyalty program on the public's confidence in the
government notwithstanding, the unwillingness on the part of the Truman
administration to take a

positive

stand

on

civil

liberties also

contributed to a repressive atmosphere.
Hie

proposed

Caimission

on

Internal

Security

and

Individual
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Rights, often touted as a defense of civil liberties, also exhibited
the political nature of the debate over internal security.
another

Truman

assistant,

pointed

out

that

Senator

David Bell,

McCarran

had

appointed a subcommittee June 1 to address the same issues which the
Presidential

ccmmission

would

examine.

Bell

argued

that

the

administration should establish a caimission before Congress did, in
order to "take the spotlight and the ball."
White House could

That way, he claimed, the

direct the discussion on internal security and

34
individual rights, stealing thunder from the Mundt-Nixon bill.
Bell
readily admitted the partisan nature of his strategy, but offered no
positive

course

for

the

administration

to take

concerning

civil

liberties.
The events of 1949 and 1950 illustrated the great support for
repressive

internal

security

legislation.

There

also

existed

a

consistent, powerful opposition to these laws on the part of liberals
and others.

The inconsistent political force during this period was

the administration of President Harry Truman. The President and his
assistants continued to see the debate in political terms.
predictably, they

made their

Congress and the public.

position

contingent

on the

Perhaps
mood

in

In doing so, however, they contributed to the

erosion of individual rights.

The commencement of hostilities in Korea

on June 25, 1950, marked the beginnings of further trouble for civil
liberties in the United States, as the nation geared up for a hot war
with Communism. Hie Truman administration, under pressure to wage this
war at home as well as abroad, found itself wedged between overzealous,
repressive legislation on one hand and fundamental American liberties

40

on the other.

The White House had itself as well as others to blame

for the discomfort.
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CHAPTER THREE
The

Korean

conflict

encouraged

even

greater

anti-ccrrinunist

sentiment in the United States than had existed previously, and the
response of the Truman administration reflected the equivocation with
which the President and his aides approached the heightened threat to
civil liberties.

While Truman initially won favor with his prosecution

of the war, hard-line anti-Ccmnunists in Congress quickly regained the
advantage, and public sentiment rose to a fever pitch.

In July, 1950,

67

supported

percent

of

the

respondents

to

a

Gallup

registration of

Ccmnunist Party members.

polled

the

favored

industries.

removal

of

poll

the

Ninety percent of those

Ccmnunists

frcm

important

war

And 85 percent of those polled favored, in the event of

war with the Soviet Unicn, either the registration, iirprisonment,
deportation, or execution of Ccmnunist Party members. Only one percent
said nothing should be done because "everyone is entitled to freedom of
thought.""'" The supercharged political atmosphere, fueled by the coming
elections, accelerated the passage of drastic security measures.
war

provided

the

climate

for

hysteria

to

dominate

the

Hie

election

campaigns, and the demagogue Joseph McCarthy struck a hard blew when he
charged that the State Department had sabotaged funds earmarked for the
South

Korean

army,

thereby

necessitating

American

intervention.

According to McCarthy, only $52,000 of $112,900,000 in military aid
2

actually made it to the South Korean military.
Private
threat.

persons also

struck

out

at

the

perceived

Ccmnunist

Sponsors of a speech Owen Lattimore planned to give at a New
43

44

Hampshire hotel cancelled his engagement because, in the words of one
person involved, "anyone about whan there is any question should not be
allowed to speak."

3

Professor Lattimore had previously cane under heavy

fire frcm the House Un-American Activities Carmittee, and more recently
from Joe McCarthy, who claimed that Lattimore was the Kremlin's top
agent

in the State Department. His sponsors cancelled

Lattimore's

speech despite the fact that a Senate subcommittee had completely
cleared him of all charges, calling McCarthy's charges a "fraud and a
hoax."

Lattimore's trouble illustrated not only the repressive impact

of the Korean War, but also the effectiveness of the red-hunters'
ability to injure their enemies with publicity.

The subcommittee's

exoneration of Lattimore never caught up to the initial accusations or
the press's questioning of the professor's innocence.
The Truman administration found itself once again in the situation
of having to fight Ccmnunism while offering the public a political
alternative to Congressional opponents.

The course of events frcm June

to September of 1950 revealed that the administration, under daunting
pressure, could not or would not put civil liberties on an equal
footing with political strategy.

At the very least, it would be

accurate to say that the administration's battle with Congressional
anti-Ccmnunists

assumed

such

proportions,

and

such

a

degree

of

partisanship, that the administration's efforts on behalf of civil
liberties were indistinguishable from its efforts to maintain political
strength.
The Korean conflict gave new hope to proponents of the Mundt-Nixcn
legislation and presented new problems for the Truman administration in
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the area of internal security.

In June, Pat McCarran appointed a

Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, with Senator Warren Magnusan as its
chairman, to draft internal security legislation.

Magnusan wanted to

introduce a bill, as a counter to the Mundt-Nixon bill, which would
give the President broad powers to arrest and detain any individual
known to be a member of an organization advocating the forceful
overthrow of the government.

In order to implement this power, the

President would be required to determine that a disturbance threatened
international relations and declare a national emergency.

Ihen, the

President would have to obtain the consent of both houses of Congress.
After

which,

the

President

could

implement

the

detention

of

"subversives."
Truman's

effort to garner the support of a public

bent

on

repression reflected not cnly the administration's preoccupation with
politics rather than civil liberties, but also the extent to which the
administration shared its opponents' assumptions about the Caimsunist
threat and the proper way to respond.

In a memo en July 12, Stephen

Spingam argued that Magnuscn's proposal was worse than the Mundt-Nixcn
bill and would anger most of the liberals in the country.

Spingarn

then suggested that an effective counter-proposal to Mundt-Nixon would
be to require all political organizations "to make public the sources
of their funds, how they disburse them, and who their officers are."

4

In response to the mounting pressure to do something about internal
security,

Spingarn

supervision.

proposed

broadening

the

pcwers

of

government

"It is usually true," Spingarn ocnmented, in a telling

statement about the administration's regard for individual rights,
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"that you can't lick something with nothing."

Spingarn's attitude

revealed his willingness to accept restrictions on civil liberties in
order to win a political battle, and also revealed that he shared basic
assumptions with his enemies en the right concerning the comparative
value of civil liberties and internal security.
July 1950 saw a flurry of legislative activity and administration
responses.

On July 12, the House passed H.R. 7439, a bill which

provided for the summary suspension of federal enployees determined to
be a security risk by the heads of government agencies.

The bill

authorized

he

necessary."

an

agency

head

to

dismiss

an

employee

"as

deems

The employee would receive the charges against him in

5
writing, but only "as specifically as security considerations permit."
Although many Truman supporters vehemently opposed such legislation,
they failed to recognize that the President's loyalty program contained
virtually the same provision.

The Nation pointed out that, under the

bill, "any government employee may be made the victim of personal
animosity and may be accused, prosecuted, and convicted by a single
official."**

Such

hasty and

ill-considered

legislation

soon

became

cannon in Congress.
The President also had trouble controlling the enthusiasm of the
Justice Department for chasing Communists. This was especially true
when Tcm Clark headed the Department, but problems continued to plague
the President, even after the appointment of a new Attorney General, J.
Howard McGrath. Without a clear mandate from the President outlining
the administration's stand on civil liberties, the Justice Department
7
continued to pursue "law and order" with relatively unfettered vigor.

Hie Justice Department had sponsored an internal security bill, H.R.
4703, in 1947. The measure underwent substantial revision over the next
several years, due to objections concerning seme overly repressive
sections raised by the Treasury Department, which reviewed all bills
under consideration as part of the Bureau of the Budget's role in the
legislative process.

The major sections of H.R. 4703 provided for a

tightening of the Espionage Act of 1917 (extending the statute of
limitations) and the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (the new
provisions required

all those with knowledge of foreign espionage

tactics to register).

The bill also allowed for the Secretary of

Defense and the President, in a time of national emergency, to mate any
regulation protecting any property they deemed to be in the interest of
national security.

The House passed the bill in March 1950, and, by

mid-July, its companion bill, S. 595, awaited debate in the Senate.
Stephen Spingarn suggested that Truman lend his approval to the
bill.

Spingarn argued that the bill had been substantially improved

over its original provisions and, most important, would serve as an
answer to the Mundt-Nixon bill then under consideration.

"I have been

influenced to seme extent in this judgment," Spingarn said, "by the
fact that the current version of the Mundt-Nixon bill has been gaining
O
great strength en the Hill since the Korean situation broke." He also
took the opportunity to reocnmend that S. 595 adopt his notion for
9
registering all "subversive organizations" instead of just Ccmnunists.
Once again Spingarn reacted to the pressure for repression with a bill
only somewhat less overtly repressive than the bill Congress had

48

Hie battle over internal security continued to escalate throughout
July and

August. As Congress rode a wave of

public support for

crackdowns en Ccmnunists, the administration fought a rearguard action
which, while clearly more protective of civil liberties than Congress,
nevertheless revealed that the White House was unwilling to risk public
support in order to preserve basic freedoms.
Congress

and

the

Truman

The conflict between

administration

centered

on

the

Mundt-Ferguson-Johnstan legislation, S. 2311. The registration

and

disclosure provisions of the bill were distasteful to the President and
offered the means by which the White House could differentiate itself
from its opponents in Congress. With his back to the wall, Truman
appeared finally to acme down on the side of civil liberties.
boldly declared

in a July

22 conference that

he would

He

veto any

legislation that violated the Bill of Rights, regardless of the fact
that it would be an unpopular move in an election year.^ Truman hoped
to have it all ways.

He portrayed himself as a defender of civil

liberties and his opponents as violators of the Constitution. At the
same time he set himself up as the true defender of internal security
and his opponents as obstructionists.
Spingarn's report on S. 2311 detailed its constitutional and
practical shortcomings.

The bill, he noted, contained a significant

revision of its predecessor, the Mundt-Nixon bill. Instead of directly
outlawing the Cancnunist Party, S. 2311 required proof that a suspect be
found to have conspired to perform an "act which would substantially
contribute

to

the

establishment

within

the

United

States

of

a

totalitarian dictatorship" and that a foreign entity controlled that
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effort.

Spingarn argued that if the Smith Act of 1940, which required

only that the prosecution prove that a subversive entity advocated or
taught the violent overthrew of American government, were held to be
valid by the courts, then the new bill, much harder to enforce, was
unnecessary and cumbersome.

Experience, he said, indicated that frati

two to three years of bureaucratic and legal procedure would elapse
before the Subversive Activities Control Board could require any group
to

register.

And

given

the

secrecy

and

mendacity

of

Ccmnunist

organizations, one could count on their refusal to register.

In short,

the bill would contribute nothing to internal security.
Spingarn also attacked the constitutionality of S. 2311. Hie
phrase "substantially contribute" was vague, he argued, and lent itself
to being construed as prohibiting legal action which sought drastically
to change the government, such as a constitutional amendment.
prohibition,

he

claimed,

made the

bill

void

on

its

face.

This
The

President's special assistant also brought up the old argument that the
registration provision of the bill, requiring that Ccmnunists who were
not on the Attorney General1 s formal list register themselves, violated
the Fifth Amendment's command that "no person shall be canpelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."

Finally, Spingarn

mentioned the possibility that the proposed legislation constituted
prior restraint by providing that the simple fact of party membership
and not any physical behavior constituted a crime."'''''
To Spingarn's credit, seme of his remarks, though tempered by his
emphasis an the practical difficulties of the bill, did defend the
principle

of

civil

liberties.

But

they

also

reflect

Spingarn's
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assumption that certain forms of restrictions were legitimate, most
notably the Attorney General's power to determine who would and who
would not be compelled "to be a witness against himself."
Even as Spingarn wrote, times continued to get worse.

As if

existing pressure to pass S. 2311 were not enough, American forces in
Korea suffered setback after setback and, by the end of July, found
themselves packed into a small area surrounding Pusan at the tip of the
Korean peninsula.
month

that

"the

Senator Mundt had told reporters earlier in the
climate

is certainly

passage of this (S. 2311) right now.

conducive for Congressional

If we are asking our boys to die

fighting in Korea and other areas, we certainly should protect them
12
from sabotage behind their backs here at heme."
As the situation on
the battlefield worsened, the impulse for repression at heme became
more severe.

Indeed, as the Senate approached the Mundt bill toward

the end of July, the New York Times reflected on the gravity of the
situation.

"Hie English-speaking world in all its perils," contented

the newspaper, "has not in modern history done quite what is now
13
proposed to be done."
Hie White House was sensitive to pressures frcm Congress and the
public.

Presidential assistant David Lloyd sounded the alarm with a

memo to Charles Murphy in which he noted that Freedom House, an
organization of prominent liberals, favored outlawing the Ccmnunist
Party. Hiis, he claimed, was a "very significant trend of public
14
opinion."
Hie President responded to that significant trend on August
8, with an internal security message to Congress. Hie thrust of the
President's message asserted that current laws were strong enough to
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ocmbat

Ccmnunist

subversion, and

that, as they sought

to defeat

Ccmnunist subversion, the American people should, at the same time,
safeguard civil liberties.

Truman found support for his claim that

existing laws sufficed fran a recent federal appeals court decision of
August 1 which upheld the conviction of eleven Ccmnunist Party members
under

the

Smith

Act

of

1940. Judge

Learned

Hand

supported

the

prosecution's contention that the Ccmnunist Party represented a "clear
15
and present danger" to the United States.
In his message, the President pointed to the many strong laws
already on the books.

He cited the Smith Act as well as laws against

treason, espionage, and sabotage.
naturalization laws.

Tinman also noted immigration and

And, lastly, he cited his own loyalty program as

an effective preventive measure.

The President acknowledged the need

for strong new legislation in the areas of espionage (extending the
statute of limitations beyond three years) and alien deportation.

He

took the time to criticize the Hobbs bill, H.R. 10, and offered in its
place

a

measure

authorizing

the

Attorney

General

to

exercise

supervision over deportable aliens by requiring them to report their
whereabouts, instead of detaining them indefinitely, as the Hobbs bill
required.
Truman went on to attack the Mundt legislation then pending in
Congress. "This kind of proposed legislation is dangerous," he said,
"because,

in

attempting

to

proscribe,

for

groups

such

as

the

ocmnunists, certain activities that are perfectly proper for everyone
else, such legislation would spread a legal dragnet sufficiently broad
to permit the prosecution of people who are entirely innocent or merely
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misguided."

The President also argued that the legislation would

simply drive the Carmunists underground and, if the legislation were
held unconstitutional, make martyrs of them.1*'
Truman's message made it appear that the White House was at last
taking a positive stand on the issue of civil liberties, defining its
position on relevant proposals, and striking its own course.
newspapers applauded the President's courage.

Many

The Chicago Sun Times

called Truman an ail-American, "on the first team with Washington,
17
Madison, and Jefferson."
Hie ADA sent a telegram to the Senate
Judiciary

Committee in

support

of

Truman's

suggestions and

urged

18
Americans to follow his lead in opposing repressive legislation.
Hie
New Republic, however, observed that the President's message had been
"pounced upon by every faction in Congress as confirmation of its own
original

19
opinion."

Hard-core

anti-Ccmnunists

focused

on

the

President's call for tougher legislation, while liberals focused on
Truman's assault on the Mundt-Nixon legislation and his defense of
existing laws.
civil

By failing clearly to establish an unequivocal stand on

liberties,

the

anti-Ccmnunist hysteria.

President

actually

contributed

to

the

This failure indicated not so much that the

President was overtly hostile to the Constitution, but rather that he
deemed the political stakes too high to risk a strong position in
support of unpopular principles.
The actual course that the Truman administration took in its fight
against the Mundt legislation revealed that the administration's focus
still fell short of a constitutional defense of civil liberties.

On

August 17 a group of ten Senators, including Estes Kefauver, Hubert
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Humphrey, Warren Magnuson and Soott Lucas, intrcduoed a bill which
20

embodied the President's reccmnendaticns of August 8.

The bill, S.

4061, fell prey to McCarran's Judiciary Ccnmittee, which cn the same
day reported S. 4037, McCarran's annibus internal security bill.

These

two bills represented the respective positions which the White House
and Congress took on the issue of

internal security legislation.

McCarran's bill eventually combined with a House measure, H.R. 9490, to
become the Internal Security Act of 1950.
Hie

McCarran

bill

contained

a

number

of

anti-subversive

provisions, gleaned from previous proposals in Congress. It contained
the registration and publication provisions of S. 2311, McCarran's own
reccmmendaticns authorizing the Justice Department to bar or deport a
large number of aliens, S. 595's anti-espionage sections, H.R. 10's
detention provisions, and a new effort to establish a new bureau of
passports

and

21
visas.

Hie

various

approaches

of

Congressional

hard-liners had gelled under the direction of Pat McCarran.
Hie White House reacted swiftly to the political threat posed by
S. 4037, but continued to accord a lew priority to the larger threat to
individual rights.
which

provided

The new "blockbuster" bill amended a 1918 law,

for the

exclusion

and

deportation of

"subversive"

aliens, to exclude also affiliates of the American Ccmnunist Party and
its

organizations.

"totalitarian

party"

A

White
went

administrative difficulties.

House

memo

undefined,

argued

and

would

that

the

thus

phrase

lead

to

Furthermore, such warding might not have
22

exempted officials fran foreign governments or the United Nations.

Hie extent to which the administration shared the approach of the right
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became apparent as the White House developed arguments against the
McCarran bill.

The administration focused an the deficiencies in the

bill aanpared to the President's own anti-communist efforts — not an a
defense of civil liberties.

A catmunique by Peyton Ford, the Assistant

Attorney General, argued that the nationality provisions of S. 4037
(those determining which type of alien the United States would admit
for citizenship), which amended the Nationality Act of 1940 to exclude
Communists,

were

confusing

and

administratively

Stipulations regarding membership in

deficient.

banned organizations could be

23
circumvented, he charged.
Ford made no mention of possible violations
of rights in his memo.
liberties

during

this

The executive branch's concern for civil
period,

when

expressed,

was

less

than

enthusiastic.
From the administration's awn perspective, its alternative bill,
S. 4061, took a more "rational" approach to security legislation.
Based upon the President's reoaimendaticns as embodied in his message
of August 8, the bill implied that the Smith Act and the Nationality
Act needed

no

changes, while the

Inmigration

Registration Acts needed strengthening.

and

Foreign

Agents

Hie administration's proposal

extended the statute of limitations for espionage frcrti three to ten
years, and required those with knowledge of foreign espionage tactics
to register with the Attorney General. Hie bill also substituted the
Hobbs bill's permanent detention provision (included in S. 4037) with a
parole-like provision that required deportable aliens to report their
whereabouts.
S. 4061 sought to accomplish two things.

It intended to compete
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with the popularity of the McCarran bill's anti-Carmunist position
while at the same time preserving the President's image as a defender
of

24
liberties.

civil

In

attempting

to

accomplish

this,

the

administration's bill fell prey to the same complications which the
administration's position created all along.

Instead of presenting a

position which emphasized civil liberties, Truman attempted to defeat
McCarran

by

effective.

introducing a

rival

bill, which

he argued

was more

Furthermore, the President's rhetorical support for civil

liberties and his vague concern with "undue" or "excessive" measures
25
clashed with his arguments in favor of tightening controls.
These
arguments served to heighten fear and suspicion; if the Ccmnunist
threat were as real as the Korean situation implied, and the President
recognized that a comparable threat existed internally as well, then
restrictive measures would not be unwise.

The President, through his

efforts to mitigate Congress's proposals by meeting them half way,
admitted either that his administration's efforts and existing laws had
been ineffective, or that a genuine threat existed and that threat
26

justified drastic legislation.

The administration's approach revealed

Truman's equivocation concerning civil liberties.

Moreover, Truman's

strategy failed; it resulted in a general reduction in the political
standing of the administration.
White

House

and

congressional

The increasing conflict between the
conservatives,

Truman's

weakening

political position, and his desire to gain political advantage from the
issue explained the course of events surrounding the veto of the
McCarran Act.
The White House and Congress jockeyed for position during the last
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week of August and the first weeks of September. While the Truman
administration found sane support for its proposals, the tide of battle
definitely
position

favored

weakened,

conservatives
he

found

in

seme

Congress.

of

his

As the

President's

supporters

in

Congress

abandoning civil liberties in favor of the more popular anti-Ccmnunist
bandwagon.

Campaign pressures on liberal legislators mounted, while

the Justice Department held a more favorable view of the McCarran Act
and

its House counterpart, H.R. 9490, sponsored

by John

Wood, a

Democrat fran Georgia and chairman of the House Un-American Activities
Carmittee.
However, the President was not entirely alone in his opposition to
McCarran's

proposals.

A

radio

show,

broadcast

on

August

21,

interviewed Paul Jensen, a wartime counter-intelligence officer who
vehemently
Jensen,

opposed

an

the

attorney

at

Mundt-Fergusan
the

time

of

and
the

McCarran

bills.

interview,

While

noted

the

constitutional problems the bills created, his main attack centered
around the impracticability of the bills' provisions.

He predicted

that, due to the registration requirements and the appeals provision,
"it might be four or five years, or more, before any one agent is
jailed."

Jensen went cn to poke fun at the possibility of a Ccmnunist

running to the Attorney General in order to get on the list.

Jensen

27
favored as an alternative the administration bill, S. 4061.
Hie interview with Jensen typified the kind
President

received

during this period.

of

support the

Influential figures,

both

public and private, concentrated their efforts on the ineffectiveness
and,

to

a

lesser

extent,

the

unconstitutional

nature

of

the
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Congressional

proposals.

Administration

accounts

of

news

items

emphasized the fact that "the active pendancy of this legislation has

already caused the Ccmnunist Party to greatly accelerate its movement
underground."

The result of Wood's and McCarran's legislation, argued
28

the administration, would be a "serious blow" to internal security.

The President's cwn position failed to focus on the constitutional
weaknesses of the Wood-McCarran proposals, especially in the area of
civil

liberties.

President's

Spingarn

proposals

was

commented
"very

that

gloomy"

the

and

outlook

that

the

for

the

President

29
desperately needed more public support.
The

Truman

administration's

lack

of

resolve

and

direction,

accentuated by the increasing public hysteria, served only to further
the

destruction

of

support

President's own ranks.

for

moderate

legislation

within

the

J. Howard McGrath, the President's Attorney

General, actually supported parts of the McCarran bill. In a letter to
Senator Lucas, who was ostensibly a Truman supporter, McGrath clarified
the Justice Department's views concerning the legislative proposals
then under consideration.
objections

to

the

emphasizing their

McGrath maintained the by then familiar

registration

provisions

ineffectiveness and

of

the

McCarran

impracticality.

bill,

However, he

argued for strengthening the anti-sabotage provisions of S. 4037 by
giving the President the authority, as S. 595 did, to restrict access
"to such property and places as the President may designate...in the
interest of national security."
The Attorney General brought the Justice Department's concern for
effective, enforceable laws to the internal security debate, but the
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manner in which he did so exposed a lack of concern for personal
liberty, despite his occasional statements to the contrary. First, the
provision granting the President restrictive powers raised some serious
questions concerning due process, since the President was to receive
complete power over personnel involved in areas concerning "national
security," which could include virtually any circumstances.

Second,

McGrath1 s rhetoric revealed that, in spite of his defense of the
Constitution,
subversive.

his

foremost

goal

was

to

apprehend

those

deemed

"Hie present world situation," he said, "requires the

prompt enactment of practical and constitutional legislation which will
give to the Department of Justice adequate weapons to deal with the
precise dangers which we face, while preserving our traditions of
personal liberty.

We in the Department favor the general purpose of

this type of legislation, but we do not feel that there is time enough
remaining for novel experiments in law enforcement over a period of
30
years, with doubtful, meager, and inadequate results."
Peyton Ford,
the Assistant Attorney General, encouraged the President to approve
H.R. 9490, claiming that even with the bad sections, the bill contained
31
essential legislation.
The sense of national emergency, with its
resulting disregard for civil liberties in favor of preserving internal
security, had once again made itself felt within the President's cwn
administration.
The

breakdown

of

support

for

civil

liberties

continued

in

September. Eight liberal Senators, among them Harley Kilgore, Estes
Kefauver, and Hubert Humphrey, met with the President on September 6 to
propose legislation which would fight McCarran's bill with one of their
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cwn.

To defeat

McCarran, they

proposed

an

amendment to S. 4061, the administration bill.
the

President,

in

the

event

of

an

"emergency detention"
Their amendment gave

officially

declared

national

emergency, the power to intern persons believed likely to ocnmit acts
of espionage or sabotage. The Senatorial group told the President that
a move such as this was the only possible way of defeating the McCarran
bill.

Truman told them to go ahead with the proposal and he would

reserve judgment until the bill reached him.

32

The Kilgore bill, which Spingarn called the "concentration camp"
bill, illustrated the disintegration of the anti-McCarran forces as
well as the way in which, by defining the debate in the terms which
their opponents chose, ostensibly liberal figures contributed to public
fears and to their cwn political disadvantage.

These liberals adopted

what they considered a politically sophisticated defense of
liberties.

civil

In doing so, they attempted to defend civil liberties by

restricting them, a position which proved untenable.

According to the

New Republic, the November elections had everything to do with the
liberals' change of heart.

Needing a politically attractive, "tough"

plan, the Senators introduced the Kilgore measure to steal McCarran's
thunder.

Senator

Lucas of

Illinois,

in

a

tough

race

with

his

Red-hunting opponent, Everett Dirksen, touted the substitute bill as an
alternative to McCarran's bill, which did "not go far enough."

When

the bill failed as a substitute, Lucas shocked observers by introducing
it

as

an

amendment

to

the

McCarran

bill.

These

circumstances

railroaded liberals in the Senate, after condemning the McCarran piece
as ineffective and theirs as tough, into supporting the combination
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measure.

Only seven Senators found the courage to oppose the new

Goliath. Only one of thirty-two Senators up for re-election, Herbert
33

Lehman (D-NY), voted no on the bill.

As Congress approached the day of reckoning on the McCarran Act,
the Truman administration pondered the consequences of the President
either signing or vetoing the bill.
President would veto.
anti-oamrunist

Most observers had predicted the

Keeping in mind the "overwhelming sentiment for

legislation,"

Truman's

34
dilenma.
Politically, support for the
President

and

many

Democratic

assistants

the

bill would mean that the

Congressmen

anti-ocmnunist than their opponents.

discussed

would

appear

no

less

A signature would also secure

legislation needed for the internal security of the United States. Hie
President's

aides

argued

that

defects,

such

registration and immigration provisions, could
passage.
not

as

existed

in

the

be ironed out after

In addition, the President's approval of the McCarran Act did

necessarily

mean

a

permanent

blew

to

civil

liberties.

The

President's advisers granted that the bill would give administrators a
great

deal

of

discretion

to determine

who was and

who was not

controlled by Cannunists. "But, of course," they said, "the Executive
is supposed to have enough wisdem and authority to see that this
discretion is handled properly."

Any imprecision in the legislation

would be straightened out by the courts.

"It is quite possible," they

admitted, "that seme innocent people will get hurt before the courts
have completed this work. That is unfortunate, but at worst it is only
35
a temporary situation and does not in itself justify a veto."
Despite

arguments

in

favor

of

signature,

the

President's
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administration had much more powerful and practical recommendations for
vetoing the McCarran bill than they had for signing it.
the President almost had to veto the bill.

Politically,

To sign would leave him

exposed to the "booby traps" (administrative difficulties) of the bill,
and charges that he sabotaged the McCarran Act would hurt the President
in the 1952 elections.

By signing the bill, Truman would also alienate

liberal Senators such as Lehman, Carroll, and Helen Douglas, who had
gone out on a limb for the President with their opposition to the
legislation.
actually

Truman's

help

the

aides

argued

Ccrmnunists.

The

that

signing

the

bill

would

registration

and

immigration

provisions of the act would make martyrs out of Communists. In the
process of publicizing their persecution, the Ccriaunists might be able
to

run

the

FBI

ragged,

incriminate

innocent

people,

and

force

36
disclosure of government secrets.
The President's aides also argued
that

giving

unlimited

discretion to administrative agencies, even

though this discretion may be short-lived due to court decisions, was a
bad idea.

These agencies "may not, in all cases, be able to resist the

pressure to proceed against groups and individuals who do not really
37
endanger our security."
The White House had learned its lessons over
the past few years, and was clearly wary of the possibility that the
McCarran Act would be used to attack the people and policies associated
with the New Deal. The recent growth of radical anti-Ccrrrrtunism and its
attacks on New Deal Democrats warranted such concern.
Congress passed the Internal Security Act of 1950 on September 20.
Hie House passed the bill with a vote of 312 to 20, while the Senate
voted

51 to 7 for

38
passage.

Both

Houses exceeded

the

required

62

two-thirds majority that would be needed to override a veto.
Despite overwhelming support for the McCarran
Truman decided to veto the bill.

Act, President

This decision, hewever, resulted not

so much frcm any deeply held respect for the Constitution and civil
liberties as frcm the fact that Truman had painted himself into a
corner by equivocating on the matter and offering no clearly defined
position of his own; he simply had no realistic alternative.

Spingarn

illustrated the President's dilemma clearly in a memo dated September
20. "The signing of the bill," he said, "would represent an action of
moral appeasement cn a matter of highest principle."

Spingarn argued

that having once yielded an basic principle, "the Administration would
find it difficult to make a stand when the next 'aggression' in the
field

of

internal

security

legislative

proposals

took

39
place."

Spingarn's argument about "moral appeasement," while full of impressive
rhetoric, actually demonstrated the predicament Truman had created for
himself in the field of internal security.
Spingarn drew the line beyond which the President's administration
was unwilling to go with the McCarran Act, but the line may well have
been drawn at any of a number of points in the past.

Indeed, rather

than drawing the line in, say, 1947, Truman and his administration
participated

in

the degradation

of

civil

liberties through their

development of the loyalty program, their vacillation over the State
Department files, and their consistent anti-Ccmnunist rhetoric.

Hie

McCarran Act offered the President his last chance to diminish the
power of the anti-Catiriunists, to portray himself as a guardian of
liberty,

and

at

the

same

time

to

maintain

his

anti-camnunist
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credentials.
The idea of a ccnmissicn en internal security and individual
rights

recurred

as

part

of

the

preparations

for

the

veto.

Representative Helen Douglas, a Democrat frcm California, wrote to
President Truman, claiming that she and the other Representatives had
voted against the McCarran Act because it would be ineffective and
undermine civil liberties.

She suggested that the President create a

caimissicn to clear the air, calm hysteria, and offer a fresh solution
40
to the problem of internal security and individual rights.
The Truman
administration

did

not

share

Mrs.

Douglas's

noble

intentions.

According to Spingarn, Truman saw the proposal of a ccnmissicn as a
strategic device to help sustain the veto.

The President advised him,

he said, "that he is favorably disposed toward the idea of announcing
in the veto message that he was creating a Presidential Ccnmissicn on
Internal Security and Individual Rights if this would help in getting
the veto sustained."^1
A defender of the President might argue that the establishment of
a ccnmissicn, in addition to being a popular measure, would also have
served to remove the debate over internal security and civil liberties
frcm the bitter fighting that existed between Congress and the White
House. In fact, Senator Kilgore proposed that "the hearings and the
report of a distinguished Carmission would raise the question above the
level of partisan politics, put the initiative into the hands of the
Administration, and permit the careful consideration of many important
questions

which

have

not

yet

received

sufficient

study

and

42
attention."
What Kilgore, Douglas, and perhaps others did not realize
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was that putting the initiative into the hands of the administration
would

not, could not

politics.
entire

result in raising the issue above partisan

To the contrary, the "Gentleman frcm Pendergast" viewed his

relationship with Congress in

partisan

terms, and

pursued

developments with the primary goal of gaining political advantage.
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CHAPTER POUR

The President delivered his veto message to Congress on September
22. The text of the message indicated a lack of concern about the
importance

of

maintaining

civil liberties.

The

President's aides

drafted the speech for him, and in the process of revising the drafts,
actually downplayed the importance of

individual rights.

Spingarn

commented that "the draft does not contain enough material emphasizing
how the bill would actually hurt our internal security in proportion to
the amount it contains about the danger done to our ancient liberties.
For the history books there should be, of course, seme ringing phrases
in the latter department but the arguments on the danger to internal
security are much more effective today insofar as getting the veto
sustained and convincing the country it

is right

is concerned."''"

Spingarn's Garments revealed the administration's priorities, but they
also revealed how the administration allowed its opponents to frame the
debate.

Perhaps if the White House under Truman exhibited a deep

concern for basic civil liberties guaranteeed by the Constitution, the
administration could have avoided the predicament in which it found
itself.
The President sent his veto message to each member of Congress
double-spaced and printed on only one side of each page so as to make
it easier to read.

Truman included with each copy of the message a

personal appeal from him asking that the Congressmen carefully study
2

the message before taking any action cm it.

In his message, the

President concentrated on the debilitating effect H.R. 9490 would have
68
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on the internal security of the United States. Truman argued that
despite

Congressional

arguments

that

the

McCarran

Act

was

an

"anti-Qarmunist" or "Ccmnunist control" bill, the bill "would actually
3

weaken our existing internal security measures."

The President used

the same paradoxical logic in his veto that he had used in earlier
efforts

simultaneously

to

defend

repressive Congressional proposals.

his

administration

and

attack

That is, he emphasized the danger

of the Ccmnunist threat and extolled the effectiveness of existing
laws, all in the same breath.

Speaking of the threat of Communism, he

said, "Those dangers are serious, and must be met. But this bill would
hinder us, not help us, in meeting them.
on the books strong

laws..."

4

Fortunately, we already have

This position presented an unclear

picture to Congress and the public about where the administration stood
on internal security and civil liberties.

At best, it revealed the

tendency of the Truman administration to compromise civil liberties or
to seek a middle ground which, given the clearly articulated public
mood, proved untenable.
Truman contended the McCarran Act was harmful because it would
require

the

publication

of

a

complete

list

of

vital

installations to be protected in a time of national emergency.

defense
Truman

said, "It is inconceivable to me that a majority of the Congress could
expect the Cantmander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Uhited States
to approve such a flagrant violation of proper security safeguards."
The bill would also require that the Justice Department and the FBI
waste

an

"immense"

amount

registration provisions.

of

resources

enforcing

its

unworkable

Interestingly, the President mentioned the

70

registration requirements' ineffectiveness first, and not their impact
on civil liberties.

His assistants had been making him aware of the

constitutional problems which registering the Ccmnunists would raise
since the original Mundt-Nixcn legislation in 1948. Truman argued that
in trying to enforce those sections, the executive branch "would have
to spend a great deal of time, effort, and money—all to no good
„5
purpose."
Hie President continued his assault cn the ineffectiveness of the
McCarran

bill

by

attacking

the

emergency

detention

originally proposed by his stumbling liberal allies.

provisions

"It may be," he

said, "that legislation of this type should be on the statute books.
But the provisions in H.R. 9490 would very probably prove ineffective
to achieve the objective sought, since they would not suspend the writ
of habeas corpus, and under our legal system to detain a nan not
charged with a crime would raise serious constitutional questions
unless the writ of habeas corpus were suspended.

Furthermore, it may

well be that other persons than those covered by these provisions would
be more important to detain in the event of emergency."** In taking this
path, Truman avoided criticizing a provision which almost begged to be
picked

apart

"ineffective"

on
the

constitutional
section

which

grounds,
his

own

and

instead

assistant

had

claimed
termed

a

7
"concentration-camp bill". It would be difficult to determine whether
the President pursued this course out of consideration for the tenuous
election-period

positions

of

Kilgore,

Lucas,

and

the

other

detenticn-provisen sponsors (thereby exhibiting his typical partisan
loyalty) or whether he actually believed that the impracticality of the
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provision

was

more

important

than

its

repressive

character.

Regardless, he missed a golden opportunity to emphasize the McCarran
bill's threat to traditional American liberties.

In doing so, Truman

revealed more perhaps than he would have liked about his nonchalant
attitude tcward individual rights.
President Truman devoted a significant portion of his veto message
to attacking the registration

provisions of the McCarran

bill

—

sections 1 through 17. These requirements, he said, were "about as
Q

practical as requiring thieves to register with the sheriff."

Truman

went on to attack the cumbersane legal proceedings which the Attorney
General would have to endure in order to get the Subversive Activities
Control Board to require an organization to register.

He argued that

the board would be bound by criteria which dealt with the attitudes or
states of mind of an organization's leaders.

Instead of inmediately

raising constitutional questions concerning speech, association, and
thought, such as the liberal press and even his advisors had been doing
for

two

years

with

similar

proposals,

Truman

criticized

the

impractical!ty of the provisions, comparing them to legal procedures
concerning overt criminal acts.

"Under this bill," he said, "the

Attorney General would have to attempt the imnensely more difficult
task of producing concrete legal evidence that men have particular
ideas or opinions.

This would inevitably require the disclosure of

many of the FBI's confidential sources of information and thus would
g
damage our national security."
The President did mention the threat which H.R. 9490 posed to
civil liberties, devoting approximately one third of his speech to a
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defense of constitutional rights.

The significance of the ocrrments

mentioned above lay in the fact that they revealed the President's
tendency to agree with the public's and Congress's desire for sane type
of repressive legislation in order to control the Cannunists. He viewed
the detention and registration provisions of the McCarran bill not
primarily as affronts to fundamental American concerns for liberty and
diversity but as statutes which suffered mainly frcm administrative
flaws.
That is not to say that Truman ignored the constitutional issues
raised by the McCarran Act. He included the requisite "ringing phrases"
suggested by Spingarn. He did not see the registration of the Ccmnunist
Party itself a danger to civil liberties, but the President did assert
that the registration requirements for Carittunist-frent organizations
"can be the greatest danger to freedom of speech, press and assembly,
since the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798."^ The bill based the
determination

of

which

groups

were

and

were

not

Carntunist-frent

organizations cn criteria which examined solely "the extent to which
the positions taken or advanced by it frcm time to time cn matters of
policy do not deviate from those" of the Ccmnunist movement.
Trunan was very concerned, as he and others had been in the past,
that the bill would authorize a persecution of persons advocating
liberal programs similar to the New Deal programs of the 1930's.
However legitimate this concern, Truman failed to recognize that his
loyalty program and
result.

"This

the Attorney General's list

provision could

easily

be

used

had a comparable
to classify as a

oemmunist-frant organization," said the President, "any organization
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which is advocating a single policy or objective which is also being
urged by the Ccmnunist Party or by a communist foreign government."

As

an example he cited "an organization which advocates lew-cost housing
for

sincere

humanitarian

reasons

might

be

classified

as

a

ocmnunist-frent organization because the caimunists regularly exploit
slum

conditions

as

one

of

their

fifth-column

techniques."

The

President argued that the registration sections possessed the basic
flaw of moving the government in the direction of suppressing opinion
and belief.

This, he said, was a "long step" toward totalitarianism.

"In a free country," Truman proclaimed, "we punish men for the crimes
12
they ccrmxt, but never for the opinions they have."
Apparently the
President felt that the Constitution protected New Deal Democrats but
not Ccmnunist

Party

members.

This

revealed

Truman's (and many liberals') thinking.

the

basic flaw with

They defended their own and

their allies' right to speech, but not Caimunists'. They undermined the
real meaning of the First Amendment by concentrating on the politics of
power rather than on an abstract defense of rights.
Truman spent the remainder of his speech trying to convince
Congress that existing laws were powerful enough to restrain the aims
of the Carmunists. He also objected to seme provisions which added new
standards of judging Ccmnunist behavior in the areas of immigration and
natural!zaticn which, in Truman's words, "interfere with our relations
with other countries and seriously damage our national security."
Section 22 excluded anyone who advocated any form of totalitarian or
one-party government.

The President noted that the bill would exclude

Spain, then on friendly terms with the United States, from carriercial
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or cultural exchanges with the United States. Diplomatic exchanges
would

be sharply limited also, he argued.

In fact, Truman said,

section 22 was so broad it would actually require the deportation of
any alien who operated a well-stocked bookshop containing the writings
of

loyal

Spaniards

or

Yugoslavians.

President

Truman

said

provisions such as section 22 would aid the Caimunist cause.

that

"It will

be to their advantage, and not ours, if we establish for ourselves an
'iron

curtain' against

those who can

help

us in the

fight

for

13
freedom."
The President closed his arguments with the observation
that section 25 contained the provision that aliens would be eligible
for naturalization as soon as they withdrew frcm organizations censored
by the Attorney General. This weakened the current law, he argued,
which required a ten-year wait after such withdrawal.
The concerns which the President raised in his veto message and
which the liberal press had predicted came to pass shortly after the
McCarran Act became Public Law 831 on September 23, 1950. Congress's
vote

to

override

surprises.

Truman's

veto

proceeded

as

expected, with

few

Congress received the veto message at 4:00 on Friday,

September 22. Despite the President's request that the legislators
review the message carefully, the House immediately voted to override
14
by a vote of 286 to 48.
Congress was to adjourn cn Saturday, and
would not reassemble until November 27. The battle over the bill in the
Senate, therefore, needed to be resolved before adjournment in order
for

the

campaigns.

legislation

to

provide

suitable

ammunition

for

election

The liberals needed to buy time in order for the message to

have a significant impact on the public and thereby increase the
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chances for sustaining the veto.

Senators Humphrey, Douglas, Lehman,

and the lane Republican, William Langer, filibustered for 22 hours.
Langer eventually collapsed frcm exhaustion on the Senate floor and had
to be taken to the hospital.^ The filibuster failed, and at 4:30 p.m.
cn Saturday, the 24th, the Senate voted to override the President's
veto by a vote of
President's

aides

57 to 10. Despite the overwhelming vote, the
claimed

a

small

victory,

citing

the

message's

16
favorable reception among the press.
Thus ended the two and a half year battle between the White House
and Congress over the content of internal security legislation.

Hie

President and the liberals in Congress had been "outsmarted," as the
Nation put it.

The liberal magazine noted that even the conservative

press attacked the McCarran Act for its enforcement of conformity and
orthodoxy.
—

The Nation could no longer find praise for those Senators

Kilgore, Kefauver, Lucas and

emergency detention bill.

others

—

who had

supported the

Recognizing the powerful election pressures

which drove the liberals to capitulate, the magazine claimed that "none
of these considerations, we are certain, weighs against the folly of
lending

even

tactical

support

to

the

McCarran

monstrosity.

The

hysterical will not credit the Democrats with its passage in any case?
so

the

Senate

liberals

have

given

moral

ground

to

no

purpose

whatever."^ Senator Lucas appeared to validate the Nation's criticism
when he explained his proposal to add the emergency detention provision
to the McCarran bill with the lame justification that "the American
people are anxious to have an anti-ccmnunist bill placed on the statute
books.
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As the President and the press had predicted, the McCarran Act was
an ineffective and dangerous bill.

The Ccmnunist Party refused to

register, in accordance with earlier statements premising such action,
and Attorney General McGrath responded to the Party's noncompliance
19
with a premise to pursue them "with the utmost vigor."
One can make
the argument that the Justice Department was acting so as to preclude
Congressional

accusations

that

the

administration

was

soft

cn

Ccmnunists. On September 20, McGrath told the American Bar Associaticn
that the United States Ccranunist Party had never been very big or
20

powerful and posed no major threat.
in its refusal to register.

The Ccranunist Party was not alone

Not a single organization or individual

came forward in the weeks following the bill's passage to register as
subversive.^
The itimigraticn provisions were a disaster.

The Nation claimed

that the McCarran Act forced the immigration authorities "to make the
country and its Congress look ludicrous before the world." In 1950, to
detain an

alien

because of

his

or

her

past

affiliation

with a

totalitarian organization meant that vast numbers of European refugees,
victims of the disastrous political events surrounding World War II,
would be detained at ports of entry such as Ellis Island. In the month
following the enactment of the Internal Security Act, immigration
authorities detained, among others, a concert pianist who at the age of
ten had belonged to the Hitler Youth, a group of Italian musicians
attempting to raise money for the Italian equivalent of Boys' Town,
American soldiers' wives who had belonged to Nazi youth groups in their
childhood, and German technicians sent to the United States by American
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officials

in

Europe.

Responding

to

this

"public

display

of

foolishness," the State Department cancelled all visas in October until
22

the law could be interpreted more clearly.

The predictions cn the part of the President's staff that the
bill's

unenforceable

provisions

would

be

used

administration by its Congressional opponents came true.
to the

problems engendered

against

the

In response

by the immigration provisions, Senator

Ferguson accused the administration of trying to undermine the McCarran
23
Act by, essentially, trying to enforce it!
Senator McCarran accused
the administration of trying to discredit the law because inmigraticn
authorities refused to allow Spanish immigrants into the United States
who were or had

once

been members of

Spanish dictator Francisco

24
Franco's Falange.
The passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and the problems
which resulted from it did not reduce the desire of President Truman to
control the debate over internal security and individual liberty.

With

his position as a defender of internal security severely weakened by
the vote to override, Truman played his last hand — he sought to
25
create a Carmission on Internal Security and Individual Rights.
He
created the ocranission ostensibly to examine the issues created by the
conflict between the need for internal security and the desire to
preserve individual rights.

As noted before, though, the President and

his supporters viewed the idea of a ccmnission frcm a vantage point
which emphasized the opportunity to gain political advantage rather
than to secure the rights of American citizens.
In the aftermath of the elections, the White House received
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letters frcm influential citizens advocating the establishment of a
ccnmissicn.

Benjamin Kaplan, a law professor at Harvard, wrote that

Truman could respond to the McCarran Act and the elections with a
26

ocmmissian that would "build up sentiment over a fairly lcng pull."

Max Kampelman, legislative counsel to Hubert Humphrey, wrote that the
election results pointed to more McCarthyism in American politics.
Appointing a commission, he argued, would "take the sails frcm their
27
attack."
These well-intenticned intellectuals fell prey to the same
mispercepticns as the administration had.

They observed the debate

over civil liberties and internal security to be erne between the "good
guys" (themselves) and the "bad
Such

a

perspective

blinded

guys" (hard-line anti-oannunists).

them

to

the

possibility

that

their

solutions, like those of their enemies, might be detrimental to civil
liberties.

A oatmission would not necessarily elevate the debate above

politics, but to liberals such a structure would definitely remove the
issues

frcm

their

opponents'

control.

Wearing

these

political

"blinders" made liberals see wresting control over the liberty/security
debate to be cne and the same as striking a blew for the Constitution.
In fact, they were carpeting for control of the system, rather than
defending liberty in the abstract.
The Truman administration also saw the

battle between civil

liberties and internal security to be the same as one between the White
House

and

congressional

conservatives,

which

contributed

to

the

politicizaticn of a debate which did not necessarily require such
distortion.

David

Bell

wrote

to

Charles

Murphy

supporting

the

appointment by the President of a Carmissicn on Internal Security and
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Individual Rights. This should

be done, he said, before Congress

reassembled. In the same letter Bell suggested that Truman should make
28

a point of the ccnmissicn1 s being above politics.

Bell advocated,

essentially, that an effective strategy in the President's war with
Congressional hard-liners would be to make the ccnmissicn appear above
anything smacking of strategy.
Murphy himself wrote to the President suggesting the same thing —
that a ocmmissian should be appointed before an increasingly hostile
Congress reconvened.

Murphy pointed out that Senators McCarthy and

Ferguson wanted to extend their investigation of subversion in the
government beyond the State Department to the Department of Agriculture
and

the

Bureau

of

the Budget. "In

my

judgment,"

he

said, "the

appointment of a Carmissicn of outstanding citizens, frcm both major
political
charges.

parties,

would

effectively

counteract

such

political

The findings of the Ccnmissicn would undoubtedly strongly

endorse the effectiveness of the President's Loyalty Program. Because
such a Ccnmissian could not be attacked as partisan, its judgment would
carry great

public weight and

be a firm

reliance for Democratic

candidates in 1952." Murphy admitted that a ccnmissicn "cannot be
expected to shut the Republicans up," but went cn to argue that the
ccnmissicn "would help to shew up the Republicans as unpatriotic
politicians, ready to undermine their government to gain votes — which
29
is in large degree the truth of the matter."
One might well have
levelled

Murphy's

administration

charges

of

itself, especially

anti-ocmnunist rhetoric.

demagoguery
given the

against

the

President's

oc-

Truman
jtent

80

Hie Ccnmissicn on Internal Security and Individual Rights, or the
Nimitz Ccnmissicn as it came to be called, inevitably suffered frcm the
very partisanship which it ostensibly sought to overcome.

In order to

be effective, the ccnmissicn required the service of highly visible
individuals who were familiar with the workings of government, internal
security, and law.

These persons, due to the nature of their skills,

tended to do business with the government.
that

the

President

obtain

It was therefore necessary

exemptions

frcm

the

various

conflict-of-interest laws for people whom he wished to appoint to the
ccnmissicn.

Unfortunately, Truman needed the approval of the chairman

of the Senate Judiciary Ccnmittee, Senator Pat McCarran, in order to
obtain the exemptions.
out

that

In a letter to McCarran, the President pointed

exemptions frcm

unprecedented.

ccnflict-of-interest

laws were far frcm

Truman noted Admiral Nimitz's observation that persons

involved in government service had recently obtained exemptions frcm
both the Defense Production Act of 1950 and the Federal Civil Defense
Act

of

30
1950.

While the

House was willing to pass

legislation

exempting ocrmission members frcm ocaiflict-of-interest laws, McCarran
blocked efforts in the Senate to do the same, and June of 1951 saw the
end of Truman's efforts to bolster his reputation in the area of
31
internal security and civil liberties.
Truman's veto of the McCarran Act and his subsequent efforts to
regain political advantage through the establishment of a cammissicn cn
internal

security

and

individual

rights

demonstrated

that

the

President, despite his occasional rhetoric supporting civil lib°r

es,

did not regard individual liberties in the United States arr

~op
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priority of his administration.

Through his veto message and the

ocnmissiori Truman sought to attain what moral high ground he could,
given the depths to which the debate over internal security and
individual rights had sunk.

But this moral superiority, couched as a

defense of the Constitution, was more a political ploy than a genuinely
felt sentiment.

The President himself was guilty of undermining the

spirit of the Constitution, as were his opponents in Congress, through
their disregard for civil liberties in favor of the more popular,
politically safe repression of free thought.
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CONCLUSION

The

Truman

administration's treatment

of

the

debate

between

internal security and civil liberties revealed much about presidential
politics during the Truman era.

Harry Truman brought his machine

background to the White House, and his loyalty to the Democratic Party,
along with his cwn anti-ocmnunism, led him to see his opponents as a
threat to civil liberties but to disregard the impact, at heme and
abroad, of his cwn efforts to combat Ccmnunism.
Truman not only failed to ccxnbat the repression of civil liberties
in America, he contributed to it through his federal loyalty program,
Smith Act prosecutions, and strident anti-ccmraunist rhetoric.

Truman

competed with conservatives in Congress for the support of Americans
who favored the vigorous prosecution of the Cold War at heme as well as
abroad.

In the process, the President contributed to public hysteria

and undermined his own position.

Frcm its inception in March 1947

until 1952, the loyalty program served to undermine American civil
liberties, despite standards which ostensibly protected those employees
undergoing invetigaticn.

Employees were denied the right to confront

their accusers or examine evidence brought against them, due to the
program's emphasis cn protecting investigations rather than suspects.
Hie Attorney General possessed unchecked authority to list subversive
organizations without public justification or appeal.
served to restrict the association of

Such measures

rederal employees with any

unorthodox causes and created a climate of fear and suspicion.

jMs

tendency came about largely because of the President's enphasis cn both
84
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internal security and political expediency.
President Truman's reaction to Joseph McCarthy's demand to examine
State Department loyalty files illustrated hew Truman pursued political
advantage while at times using the rhetoric of civil liberties to do
so.

McCarthy charged that spies infested the State Department with

Secretary

of

State

Dean

Acheson's

approval

and

that

a

simple

examination of the Department's files would reveal this to be the
case.

The President initially refused to release the files, claiming

that the separation of pewers established by the Constitution protected
the executive branch frcm

such intrusion.

Truman's administrative

assistants provided additional support for the President's position
with the argument that the files contained unproven information and
that to release this information to the public would unfairly punish
innocent

individuals.

By

taking

this

approach,

Truman

portrayed

himself as the protector of the Constitution and individual rights.
the pressure to defend

As

his office mounted, however, the President

succumbed to McCarthy's insistence and allowed a Senate suboarmittee to
examine the files, claiming that the files had been examined years
earlier by Congress and thus did not
separation of pewers.

constitute a breach of the

Abdication or no, such action cn the part of

President Truman revealed his defense of civil liberties to be more
rhetoric than conviction, and which served as a political tool in his
battle with Congress.
The battle between the Truman administration and Congress over
internal security legislation between 1948 and 1950 culminated in the
passage of the McCarran Act over the President's veto cn September 24,
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1950. Hie episode revealed that Truman's concentration cn political
advantage over civil liberties, as illustrated by the loyalty program
and the State Department files, was a consistent trend.

Beginning with

the Mundt-Nixon bill, H.R. 5852, in 1948, conservatives in Congress
attempted to outlaw the Ccranunist Party by, in effect, simultaneously
requiring

its

members

to

register

membership in the party illegal.

their

affiliation

and

making

The Truman administration initially

responded to this effort with constitutional arguments which mirrored
those of the liberal press.
in

1949

and

The Mundt-Nixon bill (and its successors

1950) threatened

not

just

to

deny

First

protection to Communists, but to liberal ideas as well.

Amendment

The arbitrary

actions of the proposed Subversive Activities Control Board could quite
easily violate Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses during a
jury trial.
against

The Hobbs bill threatened the Fifth Amendment's protection

self-incrimination

by

requiring suspects to divulge their

"associations and activities."
While liberals kept haxrmering away at the repressive provisions of
the proposed legislation, the administration hesitated, vacillated, and
equivocated

in

an

attempt

congressional conservatives.

to

gain

political

advantage

over

Truman's assistants in the White House

sought ways to mitigate the harmful effects that the Alger Hiss case,
Soviet

nuclear

capability,

the

Ccranunist

takeover

in

China, and

eventually the Korean war had on the administration's anti-ccranunist
reputation.
direct

In doing so, the Truman administration shifted away from

confrontation

politically neutral

with

Congressional

position

advocating

conservatives
"balance"

to

between

a

more

internal
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security

and

individual

rights.

Such

a

tactic

sacrificed

civil

liberties for political advantage and revealed the President's true
priorities.
The Korean War combined with upccrning elections to instigate an
intensification of efforts on the part of Congress to pass sane type of
internal security legislation.

Truman responded to those efforts with

a security message to Congress which argued that yes, there were sane
improvements to be made in the existing security laws, but by and large
current laws were effective enough to combat subversion.
the

President

argued,

pending

legislation

would

not

Furthermore,
only

harm

individual rights, it would have the detrimental effect of hindering
investigative efforts by driving the Caimunists underground.

Truman's

speech was designed to make him appear both tough on Ccmnunism and
concerned about civil liberties.
In order to ccmbat Congressional conservatives, the administration
offered its own bill, reflected the recommendations contained in the
President's security message.

In addition to the administration's

efforts, liberal senators proposed a "concentration camp" bill which
would allow the President, in the event of a national emergency, to
intern persons he suspected were likely to commit

sabotage.

The

President's bill died in ocnmittee, and the "liberals'" bill became
attached to the McCarran proposal.

Congress passed the bill by a wide

margin on September 20.
Truman was now faced with the problem of whether to veto the
McCarran bill or not, and his decision to veto, as well as his veto
message, revealed his desire to maintain as much political advantage as
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possible.

After the fierce struggle over the McCarran Act in Congress,

Truman could

not accept it.

anti-carmunist credentials.

Yet

he needed to maintain his cwn

Thus, in his veto, the President failed to

concentrate on the threat to civil liberties which the McCarran Act
posed; instead he emphasized the bill's ineffectiveness.

This approach

tended to validate Congress' repression of individual rights.

Not

surprisingly, his half-hearted effort failed, and early in the morning
of September 24 the Internal Security Act of 1950 became law.

Truman

continued to try to gain political advantage with the establishment of
a ccnmissicn to study the subject of internal security and individual
rights, but even that effort suffered frcm the partisan nature of
Truman's administration.
The administration of President Truman expressed a concern for
civil liberties which, while greater than that of its Congressional
opponents, fell short of a principled defense of individual rights.
Instead, Truman adopted the notion that, in order to ccnpete with
Congress during a period of Cold War hysteria, seme rights, including
the right of association, the right to confront witnesses, and the
right to due process, had to be abridged.

"The buck steps here" was a

slogan of Harry Truman's, meaning that he and no one else would be
responsible for his actions.

If one holds Truman accountable for his

policies cn internal security, one cannot ignore the role he played in
undermining civil liberties.
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